Financing technology in a post-2012 international climate change agreement: leveraging private investment for climate change mitigation technologies by Higham, Andrew
Page 1 of 94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Financing technology in a post-2012 
international climate change 
agreement: 
Leveraging private investment for climate change 
mitigation technologies 
 
Dissertation for a Masters of Arts in Ecologically Sustainable Development 
Murdoch University 
Western Australia 
 
Andrew Higham 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 APRIL 2010 
 
Page 2 of 94 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
The author acknowledges the valuable reviews and feedback from Heleen de Coninck, Stefan 
Baker, Jos Sijm, and Xander van Tilburg. 
 
 
Declaration 
 
 
I declare that this dissertation is my own account of my own research. It contains as its main 
content work which has not been previously submitted for a degree at any university.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Higham 
 
Page 3 of 94 
Contents 
CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................................................3 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................................4 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................6 
2 OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ...................................................................9 
3 THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC LEVERAGING OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT .................. 11 
3.1 WHAT IS LEVERAGING? ................................................................................................................ 11 
3.2 KEY ISSUES IN MEASURING THE LEVERAGING EFFECT OF PUBLIC POLICY INTERVENTIONS ........... 12 
3.3 THE RATIONALE FOR INCREASING THE SHARE OF PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCING ............................ 18 
4 THE TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION CYCLE, TYPES OF FINANCE AND PUBLIC 
 LEVERAGING OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT .............................................................................. 21 
4.1 THE TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION CYCLE AND LEVERAGING ........................................................... 21 
4.2 TYPES OF FINANCE AND LEVERAGING ........................................................................................... 25 
5 THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT: A PREREQUISITE FOR PUBLIC LEVERAGING OF 
 PRIVATE INVESTMENT ................................................................................................................. 28 
6 THE FINANCING GAP .................................................................................................................... 31 
6.1 CURRENT FINANCING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES ................................... 33 
6.2 ESTIMATES OF FINANCING NEEDS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES ................. 34 
6.3 INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY GAPS IN GLOBAL FINANCING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ........................ 37 
6.3.1 Public financing instruments to raise finances ........................................................................ 38 
6.3.2 Public financing mechanisms: The need for public venture capital ........................................ 40 
6.3.3 Increasing the flow, scale and quality of proposals ................................................................. 42 
6.3.4 Global financial architecture: Role of the financial mechanism of the Convention ................ 44 
6.3.5 Key gaps by stage of technological maturity ........................................................................... 46 
7 LEVERAGING RATIOS OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED MEASURES TO FINANCE 
 CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES ............................................................. 50 
7.1 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................................... 52 
7.2 DEMONSTRATION ......................................................................................................................... 58 
7.3 DEPLOYMENT ............................................................................................................................... 63 
7.4 DIFFUSION .................................................................................................................................... 68 
8 SUMMARY OF LEVERAGING POTENTIAL BY STAGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
 MATURITY ........................................................................................................................................ 74 
9 ESTIMATING THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SHARE OF FINANCE FOR  
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES BASED ON  
AVERAGE LEVERAGE RATIOS ................................................................................................... 77 
10 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................. 81 
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................................ 85 
 
Page 4 of 94 
Abstract 
The Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2007a) acknowledges the central roles of finance and technol-
ogy in the successful implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (‘the Convention’). They form two of the four building blocks for a post-2012 interna-
tional climate change agreement. For developing countries, the conclusion of negotiations for an 
acceptable and successful agreement hinges upon the provision of financial and technology sup-
port from developed countries, commensurate with the identified needs, in accordance with the 
polluter pays principle and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respec-
tive capabilities, and reflecting the full agreed incremental costs of meeting the objectives of the 
Convention.  
 
This dissertation presents research undertaken in support of these negotiations and the design of 
new financing and technology development and transfer policies to underpin the mitigation and 
adaptation efforts of the post-2012 agreement, as mandated by decision 3/CP.13 of the Confer-
ence of the Parties. The research contained within this dissertation draws and builds upon the re-
ports of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (UNFCCC, 2008a; 2009a;b) which were pre-
pared in response to the mandate of the Conference of the Parties. 
 
Financing for technology will need to be scaled up by an order of magnitude, across all technolo-
gies and in all nations (UNFCCC, 2009b). In the order of USD 1 trillion in investment, both pub-
lic and private, needs to be mobilized each year (IEA, 2008a). Using estimates of the incremental 
costs for developing countries, the cost for Annex II Parties is estimated at an additional  
USD 262–670 billion per year for mitigation technologies and USD 33–163 billion per year to 
adapt to climate change (see UNFCCC, 2009a, pp 31–33).  
 
A wide range of financing options and technology development and transfer policies are avail-
able, some with greater potential than others to mobilise the necessary financial resources. Effec-
tiveness varies across policy instruments. Combining policy options so as to exploit synergies, 
and matching of policy responses to local and national circumstances can be significant determi-
nants of a successful regime.  
 
This dissertation attempts to assess and compare the possible public and private financing needs, 
based on the policy concept of ‘leveraging the private sector’, which is commonly touted within 
the negotiations by many national governments as an essential policy objective for finance and 
technology. Available options are described and proposals are analysed according to their effec-
tiveness.  
 
Scenarios of public and private financing for technology development and transfer are developed 
based on the average leveraging ratios achieved by a wide range of policies and programmes at 
the national, regional and international level. Policies under consideration both at the international 
and national levels are included where estimates of their leveraging potential can be made. The 
assessment is made for each stage of the technology innovation cycle (research and development, 
demonstration, deployment, diffusion) and estimates are made of the amounts of public financing 
required.  
 
The results of this dissertation point to the significant role that public finance will play in achiev-
ing the objectives of the Convention. Scenarios that involve a significant increase in the leverag-
ing effect of public policies and investment programmes on the private sector will still require 
substantial public investment, in the order of USD 30–160 billion per annum. It is estimated that, 
under this scenario, the private sector share of total investment would be increased from the cur-
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rent levels of approximately 60 per cent to 75–80 per cent. The results also suggest that the finan-
cial mechanism of the Convention needs to take a more prominent role in coordinating the overall 
delivery of financing and to help optimize the potential for private sector financing. Integrated 
design of public policies and investment programmes will be important and a wide range of inno-
vative financing instruments and types of finance will need to be deployed in a targeted way to 
address qualitative and quantitative gaps in the existing financial arrangements.  
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1 Introduction 
The concept of ‘leveraging’ is a common feature of the design and operation of public policy in 
many policy domains. One indicator of the performance of public policy that is often used is the 
level of private sector leveraging that is achieved. Throughout this dissertation leveraging is de-
fined as the ratio of public investment to private investment directly stimulated from the public 
intervention1
Within the context of the negotiations for a post-2012 agreement under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
. 
 
2, the concept is particularly important 
given the radical shifts in investment that are necessary to avert dangerous climate change (Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA), 2008a). Given the scale of investment required and the fact that 
the private sector is the primary owner and determinant of the flow of technology and hence 
emissions reduction and adaptation outcomes, the interaction between public and private invest-
ment is crucial. Scarce public resources must be used to leverage private sector activities and in-
vestments if there is any hope of meeting the ultimate objective of the Convention3
• Doornbosch and Knight (2008) who provide analysis of public financing, but do not as-
sess private sector leveraging ratios; 
.  
 
During the negotiation process under the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Ac-
tion under the Convention (AWG-LCA) in 2008 and 2009, some Parties went as far as to suggest 
that new financing under the Convention is not necessary and that almost all of the shifts in in-
vestment that are required could result from removing barriers to and providing incentives for the 
private sector (UNEP-SEFI, 2002; UNFCCC, 2008b). By the time Parties reached Copenhagen in 
December 2009, the text they were presented with had no less than 17 separate provisions with 
specific references to the need to leverage private sector investment (UNFCCC, 2009c).  
 
However, there has been limited quantitative policy research focused on leveraging within the in-
ternational climate change policy context (OECD, 2009a). While estimates of current and future 
financing needs have been made (UNFCCC, 2009a;b), information on the effectiveness of differ-
ent types of public policies and investment programmes in leveraging private finance have not yet 
been synthesised. Also estimates have not been made of the minimum amount of public financing 
that would be required to mobilise the desired total flow of financing from both public and private 
sources. This dissertation examines the concept of ‘leveraging’ and attempts to address these 
questions and provide initial estimates of the share of public and private financing that will be 
needed.  
 
The dissertation builds upon the scarce literature that has been published on the leveraging effects 
of climate change policies, particularly:  
• the work undertaken through the Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative (Basel Agency for 
Sustainable Energy (2006), and New Energy Finance (NEF) and United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (UNEP) (2008), Vivid Economics, 2009) which assesses current 
practices in public financial instruments for climate change and makes recommendations 
on how to enhance those practices;  
                                                 
1 The leveraging ratios are expressed as x:y, where x is the public investment made and is always kept constant at 1, 
and y is the private investment that is the direct result of the public investment made.  
2 Here within known as ‘the Convention’ or the UNFCCC 
3 Article 2 of the Convention. 
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• the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, et al., 2006) and work of 
London School of Economics (Romani, 2009) which examines a wide range of policy is-
sues that need to be taken into account when using public funds to leverage private in-
vestment in developing countries; and 
• evaluations of the effectiveness of specific international and national policy instruments 
that have an objective of leveraging private sector investment for climate change tech-
nologies, where such evaluations have been conducted (see citations in Chapter 7).  
 
The scope of this dissertation does not include technologies for adaptation to climate change. It is 
restricted to mitigation technologies, with particular attention to stationary energy generation, 
transport, industrial and domestic energy efficiency, noting that significant financing differences 
that exist between various technologies and sectors need to be taken into account. It is recognised 
that the potential to leverage private sector investment in technologies for adaptation is far more 
limited than for mitigation technologies, and the results of this research should therefore not be 
applied to adaptation.  
 
In assessing how public policies and investments could leverage private sector investment for 
climate change technologies this dissertation uses estimates of existing and required levels of fi-
nance that have been prepared by the UNFCCC (2007b; 2008a; 2009a;b). These estimates target a 
stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions of 500–550 parts per million carbon dioxide equivalents 
(ppm CO2-e). Information on the investment needs for stabilising at 450ppm CO2-e is limited4
The estimated additional investment required to meet the UNFCCC mitigation scenario of 500–
550 ppm CO2-e is USD 262–670 billion per annum by 2030, of which at least USD 92–302.5 bil-
lion
 
and estimates of financing needs below 450ppm CO2-e are almost non-existent.  
 
5
While the UNFCCC recognises that a significant share of the required financing will need to be 
met by the public sector, it does not make estimates of what the ratio of public and private in-
vestment might be
 will be needed in non-Annex I countries, representing 68 per cent of the respective reduction 
in emissions (UNFCCC, 2009b). Though large in absolute terms, these figures for additional re-
quired investments are small when expressed as a percentage of future global GDP (0.3–1 per 
cent) or total global investment (1–3 per cent) that would need to be devoted to climate change in 
2030 (UNFCCC, 2007a).  
 
6
This dissertation aims to help fill this gap in information by attempting to estimate the ratio of 
public and private finance, based on the assessment of leveraging effects of existing and proposed 
. The lack of information on the public cost of action has significantly ham-
pered the negotiations under the Convention. The Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009d) com-
mits to the provision of USD 100 billion per annum from 2020 from an unspecified mix of public 
and private sources. Furthermore, while the concept of leveraging is used extensively within the 
negotiating text (UNFCCC, 2009e), the specific relationship between public and private finance 
and how public finance will leverage private finance is not defined. These uncertainties prevent 
agreement on how to raise the necessary levels of public finance and how to deploy those re-
sources to give some certainty that the requisite level of private finance is mobilised.  
 
                                                 
4 The OECD (2008a) has estimated that to meet a 450ppm CO2-e stabilisation target it would cost 2.5 per cent of 
global GDP equivalent to total additional annual investments of USD 1.21 trillion. 
5 See Table 5, below. 
6 However, it does estimate the current proportion of public financing to be appoximately 40 per cent (see UNFCCC, 
2009a, pg. 60) 
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public policies. It also explores some of the policy issues that should be taken into account when 
using public finance to leverage private sector investment.  
 
The methodology used in undertaking the research for this dissertation is presented in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of leveraging private sector investment and examines the ratio-
nale for increasing the private sector share of financing for technology. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews the concept of the technology innovation cycle and how stages of technologi-
cal maturity can be used to classify public and private financing needs and to identify policies that 
are most suited to different technologies. Different types of finance are also available and are 
usually tailored to specific investment situations, which in turn can be relevant to understanding 
the concept of leveraging the private sector. The need to address gaps in the availability of differ-
ent types of finance is addressed in Chapter 6.  
 
The dissertation is focused on public policies and investment programmes that result in measur-
able private investment in climate change mitigation technologies. Public policies that have a 
more diffuse impact on private investment, such as the enhancement of the enabling environment 
that creates suitable investment conditions, are not calculated within the analysis of leveraging 
contained within this dissertation. However, because these conditions are fundamentally impor-
tant to any successful policy that aims to mobilise private sector investment, by way of context 
setting, the role of the enabling environment is addressed in Chapter 5.  
 
In Chapter 6, the financing gap for climate change is defined, based on the assessments undertake 
for the UNFCCC (2009b). The financing gap is assessed both in quantitative and qualitative 
terms. The gap is defined in monitory terms by stage of technology consistent with the approach 
explained in Chapter 4, and it is also assessed qualitatively by outlining key policy challenges that 
need to be addressed to mobilize the required quantitative flow of finance. The Chapter explains 
how this information provides an analytical basis for the remainder of the dissertation.  
 
Chapter 7 reviews the leveraging ratios of a wide range of policies by stage of technological ma-
turity, in order to arrive at an average range of the leveraging effects of policies that are in prac-
tice or are proposed within the negotiation process under the Convention.  
 
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the leveraging ratios by stage of technological maturity and 
Chapter 9 applies these average leveraging ratios, in order to estimate the total average share of 
public and private finance that will be required in a post-2012 international climate change 
agreement, based on a set of pre-defined scenarios. This in turn leads to conclusions about the 
types of financing instruments and policies that will be required.  
 
Finally, Chapter 10 brings together a summary of conclusions that result from this research and 
some preliminary findings relevant to the post-2012 climate change negotiations are presented.  
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2 Overview of methodological approach 
The methodological approach taken in this dissertation is outlined in the Figure 1. The aim of the 
research is to investigate the public and private shares of investment that might be required for 
technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least half of 2000 levels by 2050.  
 
Figure 1  Methodological approach of the dissertation 
 
Financing Gap: 
public and private
Leveraging ratios of 
existing and proposed
public policies and 
investment programmes
Average leveraging 
potential by stage of 
technological maturity
Scenarios for 
public financing 
and leveraging ratios
Conclusions and 
recommendations
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the methodology involved the following steps.  
 
In step 1, the financing gap between current financing and finance needed to deploy the mitiga-
tion technologies required to meet a 500-550 ppm CO2-e stabilization level is determined by stage 
of technological maturity based on the work of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
(EGTT) (UNFCCC, 2008a; 2009a;b). In each subsequent step in the methodology financing and 
leveraging potential of public policies and investment programmes are classified by the stage of 
technology as defined by UNFCCC (2008a; 2009a).  
In step 2, the concept of leveraging is defined, limitations of the concept are explored and it is 
placed within the context of the need for an enabling environment to support private sector in-
vestment in technology development and transfer. The leveraging performance of existing public 
policies and sources of finance is assessed based on programme evaluations, or the claims that are 
made by the source of finance or the organisation responsible for implementing the measure.  
In step 3, average leveraging ratios for each stage of technological maturity are determined based 
on the review of leveraging ratios for individual measures in step 2.  
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In step 4, because of the uncertainty associated with the level of public financing that Parties will 
commit to through the post-2012 international climate change agreement, the implications of re-
stricted public financing is assessed. Limits of public financing of USD 50 billion and USD 100 
billion annually are imposed in the scenarios. Then the level of private sector leverage required to 
meet the financing gap in step 1 is determined, which informs an assessment of what types of 
measures will be needed in light of the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009d) in which there 
was agreement to mobilize USD 100 billion per annum, including private financial sources. The 
types of policies and investment programmes considered include those being proposed by Parties 
to the Convention as part of the post-2012 international climate change agreement.  
Finally, conclusions are presented on the use of leveraging as a policy objective and evaluation 
tool, and based on the analysis in the steps above, on the type of public policy and financing ar-
rangements that should form part of a post-2012 agreement.  
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3 The rationale for public leveraging of private investment  
3.1 What is leveraging?  
As defined in Chapter 1, leveraging refers to public policy interventions which aim to stimulate 
private sector investment and is expressed as a ratio of public investment to private investment. In 
order to measure the leveraging effect of public policies, a causal relationship needs to be estab-
lished between the public policy and the ensuing private investment. This will be specific to each 
public policy. 
 
While the use of the concept of leveraging in the private sector goes well beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, it is important to recognise that the use of the term in public and private sector circles 
differs significantly. In the private sector, leverage7 often refers to the harnessing of ‘other peo-
ples money’ to grow a company and increase its productive capacity8
                                                 
7 The term ‘gearing’ is also used in the private sector as an alternative work for ‘leverage’.  
8 Often with negative connotations, such as in the 1914 book of essays by Louis Brandeis titled ‘Other peoples money 
and how the bankers use it’ (Brandeis, 1914) which criticised the powerful role of investment banks and conglomerates 
in manipulating markets, preventing competition while impacting on worker’s rights. Similarly, in the wake of the 
credit crisis, heavily leveraged banks and other firms have been criticised for their reckless use of debt and squandering 
the savings of millions of citizens.  
. There are many variations 
of the concept of leveraging used in the private sector, but perhaps the most commonly used form 
in micro-economics is the debt to equity ratio (Miller, 1991). In macro-economics leveraging 
usually refers to the ratio of debt to gross domestic product (Bivens, 2004). In the wake of the fi-
nancial crisis and recession of 2007–2010, the leveraging ratio of national governments, financial 
institutions and large multinational corporations has become an increasingly important measure 
of performance with the World Bank proposing defined mandatory limits on leveraging 
(D’Hulster, 2009). 
 
In practice, government policy makers and private sector investors are all trying to leverage each 
other’s resources to maximise the effectiveness and success of their policies and investments. 
However, the private and public sectors have different objectives in leveraging each others re-
sources. For private sector investors a primary objectives of leveraging is risk management and 
maximising the growth potential of a business (D’Hulster, 2009). 
 
Most venture capital firms seek to leverage their investments by investing jointly with other pri-
vate equity investors (a consortium or syndication approach). This consortium of investors is re-
ferred to as an investment group, and usually consists of one lead investor and a few follower in-
vestors. This team approach to investing allows these private equity investors to spread the risk of 
their investments. Private equity investors also find it beneficial to utilize various government fi-
nancial incentives to leverage their risk and cost of investment. They accomplish this by utilizing 
government business incentive programmes to leverage their own private equity in a portfolio 
company (NEF and UNEP Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative (UNEP-SEFI), 2008, D’Hulster, 
2009). 
 
From a public sector perspective, the policy objective of leveraging is more orientated toward 
shifting investment patterns, or focusing private investment toward the achievement of public 
goods (Romani, 2009; OECD, 2004; Cervantes, 1999). 
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3.2 Key issues in measuring the leveraging effect of public policy 
interventions 
There is a wide range of different public policy interventions which have the objective of leverag-
ing private sector finance. It can be useful to distinguish between these forms of intervention, as 
they may create different leveraging effects on the private sector.  
 
Individual projects, such as those funded through public financial institutions such as public ven-
ture capital funds may have isolated leveraging effects contained to the project itself but do not 
necessarily lead to any wider impacts on the behaviour of the private sector and hence do not lev-
erage discernable additional private investment.  
 
Public investment programmes may result in the leveraging of private investment in a set of indi-
vidual projects which mobilises a critical mass of investment sufficient to create new markets for 
technologies which then triggers further private sector investment. These programmes may also 
result in knowledge spill-overs (Audretsch, 1995; Audretsch, et al., 2005; Acs, et al., 2005) into 
other firms or sectors of the economy not originally part of the programme, and in doing so a 
form of secondary leveraging is achieved. If a critical mass of investment is achieved there may 
be technology learning (Nakicenovic, 1997; McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 1999; OECD, 2000; 
IEA, 2008a) or demonstration effects (US SBA, 1994; Branscomb and Auerswald, 2002; Auers-
wald and Branscomb, 2003; Murphy and Edwards, 2003; Williams, 2004; Auerswald, et al., 
2005; Grubb, 2005) which lower the risks for other investors or reduces the cost of further in-
vestments. Alternatively, the public investment programme may also involve other complemen-
tary interventions, such as the removal of barriers to investment aimed at improving the overall 
effectiveness of the public investment. An example could be investment facilitation to fast track 
approvals or to reduce trade related barriers to investment. Again the complementary support 
provided may also stimulate second order effects that mobilise additional private sector invest-
ment.  
 
A third category of public intervention includes broader government policies that aim to alter the 
underlying conditions for private investment and thereby shift investment patterns (OECD, 
2009b). An example may be a national energy policy, or a renewable energy strategy. These 
broader policies may involve a combination of programmes of investment, regulatory reforms, 
capacity building, investments in tertiary education, investment facilitation and the creation of 
greater investor awareness, which all work together to leverage private sector investment. In these 
cases there will be primary and secondary leveraging effects as described above for individual 
projects and public investment programmes, but there may also be tertiary effects, which could 
include greater total capacity to integrate a technology within a national economy, enhancements 
to the national system of innovation, increased endogenous technological capability, and other 
potentially more significant yet less tangible system changes that nonetheless will alter invest-
ment patterns and leverage private sector investment.  
 
These different forms of public intervention suggest that leveraging effects, particularly of pro-
grammes and policies, can cascade as the direct leveraging creates secondary and tertiary re-
sponses from the private sector. In this way policies might be considered to catalyse change, 
however, the indirect responses are almost always impossible to measure directly and attribute to 
a particular policy (Technopolis, 2001). This cascading effect is illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 The potential cascading effects of policies and public investments in leveraging 
private sector investment  
 
Tertiary Leveraging Effects:
Innovation systems (corporate, national), 
capacity building, 
enabling environments
Secondary 
Leveraging Effects: 
Knowledge spillovers, 
learning and demonstration effects, 
replication 
Primary Leveraging:
Direct Private Sector Investment 
Programmatic Leveraging
Project 
Leveraging
Effectiveness of policy increases 
Increasingly difficult to measure and 
attribute to particular policy 
interventions
 
 
Source: Author’s diagram derived from Carbon Trust (2007); Technopolis (2001); GEF (2004a, pg. 80). 
 
This multilayered or integrated approach is commonly referred to within the context of the cli-
mate change Convention. In fact, the act of using public financing to leverage private sector in-
vestment is just one component of the catalytic role of the Convention. Within the Bali Action 
Plan (UNFCCC, 2007b, paragraph 1(vii)), Parties decided to identify “ways to strengthen the cat-
alytic role of the Convention in encouraging multilateral bodies, the public and private sectors 
and civil society, building on synergies among activities and processes, as a means to support mi-
tigation in a coherent and integrated manner”. 
 
Leveraging, particularly within the broader context illustrated in Figure 2 above, involves impor-
tant non-financial factors that relate to capacity and learning and institutional and policy reforms 
that must accompany investments in technology. These might be considered the factors that 
create an enabling environment for public leveraging of private investment and considered in 
more detail in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
 
The Carbon Trust, a public corporation with the objective of catalysing a low carbon economy in 
the United Kingdom (UK), consistently tracks the leveraging performance of its investments. The 
estimates of its leveraging performance are subject to regular audits by the UK National Audit 
Office (NAO, 2007). In order to demonstrate the cascading effect of leverage presented in Figure 
2 and to provide a concrete example of how leveraging ratios are used in practice, Figure 3 pre-
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sents the Carbon Trust’s projected leveraging impact on the private sector, where they measure 
both the direct (primary) and indirect (secondary) leveraging that result from their programmes.  
 
Figure 3 Carbon Trust’s 2007 forecast of its overall leveraging effect illustrating the first 
and second order effects on private sector investment.  
 
 
Source: Carbon Trust (2007). Abbreviations: CT = Carbon Trust; VC = venture capital; R&D = research and develop-
ment 
 
The climate change Convention by its Article 11 establishes a financial mechanism of the Con-
vention. The COP has assigned the operation of the financial mechanism to the Global Environ-
ment Facility (GEF). While reviews of the GEF have identified weaknesses in regard to its effec-
tiveness in primary and secondary leveraging (GEF, 2003a), it has been considered effective in 
achieving tertiary leveraging effects, even though these effects have not be quantified:  
 
GEF partners have brought a wealth of value to GEF projects in the form of technical ex-
pertise, management capacity, equipment and technology, and other in-kind contribu-
tions. GEF partners have included NGOs, government agencies, regional and national in-
stitutions…and private sector entities [and this evaluation] found evidence of GEF 
projects that led to government commitment and resources (staff and budget) to continue 
activities and support replication in multiple localities. (GEF, 2005a, pg. 35) 
 
However, the GEF has made some progress in monitoring the replication effect of its projects in 
terms of greenhouse gas emission reductions. In 2004, the GEF Evaluation Office undertook a 
study which estimated that after an initial GEF project had been completed, the learning from the 
project enabled similar projects to be catalyzed within the host countries. It estimated for 104 
completed projects with an investment of USD 605 million resulting in emission reductions of 
430 million tonnes of CO2-e an additional 1270 tonnes of emission reductions were achieved due 
to this replication effect (GEF, 2004a, pg. 30).  
 
There remain significant methodological concerns regarding the use of leveraging as a measure of 
performance. The need for greater rigour in the measurement of leveraging has been a recurring 
theme in reviews of the GEF since the first overall review in 1998 which recommended:  
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The GEF should adopt a rigorous definition of “leveraging” that includes only funding 
that is additional to existing funding patterns and that is expected to create global envi-
ronmental benefits. It should apply this definition in the Quarterly Operational Report 
and other relevant GEF documents. Implementing Agencies should apply this more rig-
orous definition in their own databases and reports on cofinancing of GEF projects. 
(GEF, 1998, pg. 14) 
 
Most programme performance evaluations lack precision in the way the temporal dimensions are 
considered or reported. The leveraging effects of many programmes, particularly those in the 
early stages of technological maturity may take time to gestate. With project-based initiatives, the 
leveraging (of the first order) is more easily measured, however the longer term impacts take time 
to occur and are difficult to measure. Programmatic initiatives, particularly those that actively fa-
cilitate change through capacity building, may take longer to demonstrate a leveraging effect, and 
may indeed create more persistent change and shifts in private investment patterns. Similarly, 
short-term leveraging performance in some programmes may not result in lasting change or the 
emissions savings may be counteracted by rebound effects which are commonly found in energy 
efficiency programmes (Jalas and Plepys, 2001).  
 
Double counting and attribution errors are also prevalent when accounting for leveraging effects 
of policies and programmes. Causality is difficult to attribute because there are many potential 
influences on private sector investment, and proving that a public policy intervention caused a 
quantified increase in private investment can often be difficult, if not impossible (Technopolis, 
2001)9
                                                 
9 This problem is not unique to evaluations of leveraging effects. The problem of attribution is commonplace in evalua-
tions of public policies and programmes (Hardy and Zdan, 1997; Parmenter, 2007). 
. This can lead to double counting, especially where a technology, project or firm receives 
multiple forms of financial support or assistance from the public sector (for example between 
state and federal government agencies). Good reporting systems and programme evaluations take 
this into account but many are not transparent in how they do so. As the OECD (2009, pg. 16) has 
noted, “there are no agreed quantitative metrics for policies and programmes enacted by Annex II 
parties to incentivise private sector participation in developing country mitigation.” The 
UNFCCC needs to established adequate accounting standards for handling private sector financ-
ing within its reporting procedures to address the many potential inaccuracies in the data that are 
currently available.  
 
There may also be displacement issues that need to be taken into account when evaluating the 
leveraging effect of public policies. Some businesses may benefit at the expense of others, the 
leveraged investments may crowd out investments that may have occurred without public support 
or they may favour bigger firms causing small businesses to fail to establishing themselves. An-
other form of displacement effect occurs when the benefits of the policy intervention ‘leaks’ out-
side of the jurisdiction in which it was applied, in which case the benefit may not be captured in 
the assessed leveraging ratio (Bingham, 2005; PACEC, 2009). As Pilat, et al., (2009) explain in 
relation to the displacement effect in R&D:  
 
Traditional policies and instruments for stimulating research and innovation are under 
pressure to adapt to the global context for innovation. For example, the globalisation of 
R&D implies that the leverage effect of public instruments may become less effective if 
national firms can readily shift R&D or expand it in offshore markets with greater growth 
potential. Another possible implication is the need for greater coherence in policy making 
across government ministries and departments to increase the leverage of existing 
mechanisms.  
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Leveraging ratios should not substitute for other important measures of policy and programme 
performance. There is a wide range of measures of efficiency and effectiveness that should be 
taken into account when evaluating policies and programmes (Technopolis, 2001; Cozzens and 
Melker, 1997). A comprehensive review of leveraging objectives of housing programmes in the 
United States conducted for the House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services (US 
House of Representatives, 2007) found that a focus on leveraging may actually lead to less effi-
cient outcomes if it is allowed to distract attention from the quality of programme delivery. The 
qualitative outcomes from programmes may be less tangible; however, they may also represent 
the most important measures of success.  
 
As Bingham concludes in his 2005 review of the use and abuse of leveraging in US Federal eco-
nomic and technology development programmes:  
 
the use of leveraging ratios for making awards and conducting evaluations should be 
viewed with caution because they fail to reflect many important program goals. In spite 
of the fact that there are limitations to the use of leveraging and leverage ratios, one thing 
should be kept in mind. As an economic development strategy and evaluative tool, lever-
aging ratios are relatively new. Thus they really have not had time to develop. (Bingham, 
2005, pg. 462) 
 
Another risk associated with mechanisms that aim to maximise leveraging of the private sector is 
that they may lead to private sector entities dominating the selection of investments which may 
not lead to optimal long-term outcomes. Decision makers may give a lower priority to longer 
term technology or policy objectives in order to gain a short-term success in mobilising the pri-
vate sector to address acute public policy problems. For example, building local capacity and 
support for maintenance of an installed technology may become a lesser priority, or technologies 
that may be more expensive or complex but which have greater local potential may be forgone. 
This has been a common complaint of least developed countries during reviews of the GEF 
(UNFCCC, 2006). As the overall review of the GEF concluded in 1998:  
 
The strong emphasis placed by GEF on leveraging is legitimate, given the relatively 
small size of the fund and the fact that it is one of the few quantitative measures available 
for judging GEF success. The [evaluation] team believes, however, that there is a danger 
in placing too much emphasis on leveraging of financial resources by GEF projects as a 
measure of success. An overemphasis on total financial resources mobilized may distort 
programming decisions by tilting them in the direction of projects that have the largest 
amount of cofinancing. (GEF, 1998, pg. 13) 
 
A case in point involves small-scale renewable energy systems. The International Finance Corpo-
ration (IFC) in partnership with the GEF established the Renewable Energy and Efficiency Fund 
(REEF) in 2000 aiming to catalyze private sector investment by targeting both larger and smaller 
investment deals. According to a GEF review in 2004:  
 
a GEF cofinancing facility of about US$23 million was intended for the smaller enter-
prise deals (less than 7 megawatts), as these are often more complex, yield lower absolute 
return, and are therefore less attractive to investors. Instead, however, the investors pur-
sued a strategy of building a conventional investment portfolio with larger, more com-
mercial, grid-connected renewable energy projects before turning to smaller projects. 
This strategy failed when such potentially profitable projects did not materialize. As a re-
sult, IFC had to close down REEF in 2002. (GEF, 2004b, pg. 14) 
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Leveraging requirements can also decrease access to finance for (some) developing countries and 
can lead to substitution between funding sources. This later concern was identified as a major 
problem in both the House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Housing Review 
mentioned above (US House of Representatives, 2007) and the review of the Australian Coopera-
tive Research Centres Programme in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008).  
 
In regard to the issue of access to finance, the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2007b, paragraph 1 
(e)(i)) emphasises the need for “improved access to adequate, predictable and sustainable finan-
cial resources”. Developing countries, particularly small island developing states and least devel-
oped countries have consistently complained that existing financing arrangements for climate 
change do not allow for direct access to finance10
Mechanisms that aim to leverage the private sector in a formidable way are less likely to involve 
direct access and grant-based financing. As will be shown in Chapter 7, the most effective 
mechanisms for mobilising the private sector investment either involve the well designed provi-
sion of temporary incentives direct to the private sector, or are regulatory in nature and require 
investments from private sector entities in a completely new technology or practice. In most cases 
direct country access to funding is not a feature of these mechanisms. The exception may be pol-
icy-based approaches such as the Korean proposal for crediting Nationally Appropriate Mitiga-
tion Actions
. Indeed, the protracted negotiations on the es-
tablishment of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund have centred on the level of direct access that 
should be provided, with developed countries concerned for the efficient and transparent use of 
such funds.  
 
11
                                                 
10 See submission by the Philippines on behalf of the G77 and China and Ghana on behalf of the African Group in 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca3/eng/misc02a01.pdf, last accessed 04/2010; and the submission by AOSIS 
in http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca4/eng/misc05a02p01.pdf, last accessed 04/2010 
11 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/text/plain/non-paper_from_korea.txt, last accessed 
04/2010 
, or sectoral ‘no-lose’ target crediting mechanisms such as those proposed by Japan 
and others (Ward, et al., 2008).  
 
While leveraging the private sector may increase the total amount of finance for mitigation and 
adaptation, the benefits are likely to accrue to a small number of developing countries with larger 
markets, stronger administrative systems and domestic financing capabilities. Least developed 
countries and those with smaller economies are unlikely to benefit, as has been the case with the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Bakker, et al., 2007; Ellis, et al., 2007). Capacity build-
ing is crucial, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) and grant-based funding (particularly 
those with efficient application and acquittal requirements) will remain important for many de-
veloping countries to support early stage technologies and urgent response actions particularly 
where other financing options are not available and where private sector partners are unwilling to 
participate. 
 
Finally, mechanisms that are effective in leveraging the private sector may not necessarily ad-
dress the issue of scale. Some mechanisms (such as public venture capital funds) can be scaled up 
through larger public investments or by expanding the reach of programmes and the level of 
emissions reductions that they achieve. However, others options (such as prizes for technology 
breakthroughs) are less scaleable. In terms of existing initiatives, the CDM is one mechanism that 
is on the way to achieving effectiveness in leveraging private sector investment at a scale that is 
commensurate with total investment needs (UNFCCC, 2009b). 
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3.3 The rationale for increasing the share of private sector financing  
The concept of leveraging in public policy may have been borrowed from the world of finance. 
However, it is ultimately a concept borrowed from physics — a lever gives mechanical advantage 
and is used to amplify a small quantity of force into a larger quantity of force. For finance it im-
plies amplification of earnings by application of inputs such as debt, and in public policy it im-
plies an amplification of total investment stimulated by the scarce yet effective allocation of pub-
lic resources.  
 
In public policy, the use of the concept of leveraging may also stem from the influence of eco-
nomic rationalism and managerialism in the public service (Pusey, 1991; OECD, 1995), and is 
most certainly a response to greater scrutiny on public investment programmes and demands for 
better management information about the goals and progress of those programmes, in particular 
the cost-benefit of public investments schemes (see for example Carnegie Commission on Sci-
ence, Technology, and Government, 1992).  
 
However, the concept also has other political associations within the context of the debate on fi-
nancing for climate change under the UNFCCC. Here the concept stems from three crucial provi-
sions of the Convention, Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 5, and Article 12, paragraph 5 shown in the 
box below, which have been the subject of divergent interpretation since the Convention entered 
into force in 1994 (UNFCCC, 1994).  
 
Article 4, paragraph 3 states that:  
 
“The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide 
new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing coun-
try Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall also pro-
vide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing 
country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures that are cov-
ered by paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed between a developing country Party and 
the international entity or entities referred to in Article 11, in accordance with that Article. The 
implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predict-
ability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the devel-
oped country Parties.” 
 
Article 4, paragraph 5, states that:  
 
“The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take all 
practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing 
country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, 
the developed country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of endogenous ca-
pacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and organizations in a posi-
tion to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies.” 
 
Article 12, paragraph, 5 states that:  
 
“The developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Parties avail them-
selves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention through bilateral, 
regional and other multilateral channels.” 
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Annex II12 Parties have held the position that private finance and not public finance should domi-
nate financial flows under the Convention and that private sector funds mobilised directly through 
public policies and measures under the Convention (such as the CDM) should be recognised as 
contributions to Article 4, paragraph 3 and 5 of the Convention (see for example European Com-
mission13
On the other hand, non-Annex I Parties have argued that the provisions of the Convention clearly 
refer to public sources of finance and that private sources should complement but not substitute 
for public financing (UNFCCC, 2008b). They point out the existing commitments of Annex II 
Parties to finance the incremental costs of mitigation and the full costs of adaptation in develop-
ing countries, in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 4. They have also argued that the 
primary type of finance that should be recognised are grants rather than concessional forms of fi-
nance.
, 2009). They have also argued that a range of different types of finance should be rec-
ognised, including concessional loans and risk reduction instruments on the basis that they are a 
form of financial transfer because they contain a subsidy component and they mobilise greater 
investment in developing countries than would otherwise occur through the use of grant-based 
finance.  
 
14
                                                 
12 Annex II Parties under the UNFCCC are those (developed country) Parties who are obliged under Article 4, para-
graph 3 to provide finances to developing countries to enable the implementation of the Convention.  
13 The EU position leading up to Copenhagen was that up to 80 per cent of the incremental costs of financing mitiga-
tion and adaptation in developing countries could be financed by the private sector and by the carbon markets. The re-
mainder would be provided through a range of bilateral and multilateral public sources.  
14 See submission by the Philippines on behalf of the G77 and China and Ghana on behalf of the African Group in 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca3/eng/misc02a01.pdf, last accessed 04/2010; and the submission by AOSIS 
in http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca4/eng/misc05a02p01.pdf, last accessed 04/2010. 
 For non-Annex I Parties the issue is the need for Annex II Parties to provide compensa-
tion for historical emissions that impose costs through the need to adapt to climate change and the 
lack of opportunity to develop using low cost fuels as was the case for industrialized countries. 
 
Despite this ongoing battle within the negotiation process, the decisions of the COP and guidance 
provided to the financial mechanism of the Convention has consistently include references to 
both the need to account for private sector financing that has resulted from the public policies of 
Annex II Parties, as well as the need to report under the Convention on the leveraging that results 
from Annex II Parties’ public policies and investment programmes, and those of the funds of the 
Convention. For example, decisions of the COP (UNFCCC, 1996b; 1997c) including the memo-
randum of understanding with the GEF as the interim operating entity of the financial mechanism 
of the Convention, as well as more recent COP decisions providing guidance to the GEF 
(UNFCCC, 2008d) call on it to actively increase and report on its leveraging of other sources of 
finance, including the private sector.  
 
Furthermore, in relation to reporting on private finance through Annex I national communications 
the UNFCCC Guidelines on Reporting and Review (UNFCCC, 2000a, paragraph 54) states that:  
 
Parties shall, when reporting details of measures related to the promotion, facilitation and 
financing of the transfer of, or access to, environmentally-sound technologies, clearly dis-
tinguish between activities undertaken by the public sector and those undertaken by the 
private sector. As the ability of Parties to collect information on private sector activities is 
limited, Parties may indicate, where feasible, in what way they have encouraged private 
sector activities, and how these activities help meet the commitments of Parties under Ar-
ticle 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of the Convention. 
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Indeed, COP decision 3/CP.13 agreed “to encourage Parties to scale up and/or develop innovative 
public/private financing mechanisms and instruments that increase access to developing country 
project and business developers that play a role in the transfer, development and/or deployment of 
ESTs [environmentally sound technologies], focusing in particular on…increasing the potential 
of public funds to leverage private sector capital” (UNFCCC, 2007b, paragraph 17 (e)).  
 
In relation to the types of finance that are provided for under the Convention (i.e. concessional or 
grant-based finance), Article 1115
• “private investment flows are far more important than official development assistance to 
the same countries; 
 is categorical. It states that its purpose is the “provision of fi-
nancial resources on a grant or concessional basis, including for the transfer of technology”.  
 
Leveraging is a key performance indicator of the GEF (UNFCCC, 1998; Nichols and Martinot, 
2000). According to the GEF, the purpose of its engagement of the private sector is to attain en-
hanced levels of global environmental benefit, in light of the following points: 
• privatization of state-owned electric utilities, which accelerated in the 1990s, suggests the 
need to work more with the private sector in the energy sector; 
• private sector actors can transfer state-of-the-art technology for energy efficiency and 
other environmentally desirable objectives; 
• project sustainability and replication are often dependent on conditions that are conducive 
for further private sector investments; and 
• GEF support in this area offers prospects for further mainstreaming of similar efforts by 
the implementing agencies.” (GEF, 2003a, paragraph 14) 
 
Public financing is prone to a vast array of pressures and competing priorities and there are op-
portunity costs that arise from any particular funding choice. Public financing for climate change 
mitigation technologies may divert resources from other public good outcomes.  
 
Furthermore, the ultimate policy objective is to successful shift current investment patterns so that 
the activities of all actors in society from the household-scale through to large trans-national cor-
porations result in levels of greenhouse gas emissions that do not build-up in the atmosphere and 
contribute to climate change. In order to achieve this in the most cost-effective way, public poli-
cies and investments are required which either mandate changes in private sector investment pat-
terns or provide sufficient incentives that make those changes economically feasible, while also 
removing barriers to clean technologies and investment patterns (UNEP-SEFI, 2002; Stern, et al., 
2006; UNFCCC, 2008a, 2009a; b; Doornbosch and Knight, 2008; Romani, 2009).  
 
While Parties to the Convention continue to debate the role of public and private finance, the gap 
in financing between what Annex II Parties are obliged to provide in accordance with the Con-
vention (either public or private) and what have actually been delivered remains large, as will be 
explained in detail in Chapter 6. The financial mechanism of the Convention has attracted less 
than two per cent of the total financing required to meeting the objectives of the Convention 
(UNFCCC, 2009a), and given the required scale of financing, the efforts of the GEF to leverage 
private sector finance are unlikely to fill the overall gap in financing needs.  
 
                                                 
15 Paragraph 1, Article 11, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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4 The technology innovation cycle, types of finance and public 
leveraging of private investment 
4.1 The technology innovation cycle and leveraging 
Public policies aimed at accelerating technology development and transfer16 target different 
stages in the cycle of technology innovation (Gross and Foxon, 2003). The leveraging effect of 
public policies and investments tend to change depending on which stage of the innovation cycle 
is being targeted (see figure 5 in UNFCCC, 2009b).  
 
The literature exploring the process of technology innovation is diverse and the pattern of innova-
tion has been characterised in many different ways. Schumpeter (1911, 1934) was perhaps the 
first to make the distinction between the elements of technology cycle — invention, innovation 
and diffusion — in his study of the cycle of businesses. The concept was essentially linear, and it 
was further developed and refined by students of Schumpeter and many others from many differ-
ent disciplines throughout the 20th Century. Contemporary innovation theory has challenged the 
linear model as a poor representation of innovation in practice, arguing that process of innovation 
is dynamic and often chaotic (e.g. Kline, 1985). However, while many commentators note that in 
practice linear progressions in technological maturity are rare, a satisfying model for non-linear 
technology innovation has not emerged and for convenience most adopt a linear characterisation 
of technological maturity. 
 
Figure 4, prepared for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assess-
ment Report Working Group III Report (Metz, et al., 2006) adapted from Foxon (2003), illus-
trates some of the dynamics in the development of technologies, including the respective roles of 
the public and private sectors. The diagram illustrates a linear sequence yet also attempts to show 
that technology development learning flows both ways and in a cyclical and dynamic fashion. 
 
Figure 4  Technology development cycle and the main driving forces. 
 
 
Source: Metz, et al., (2007); originally adapted from Foxon (2003) 
                                                 
16 The phrase ‘technology development and transfer’ is used throughout this dissertation as a substitute for the longer 
phrase ‘research, development, demonstration, deployment, diffusion and transfer of technologies’ which addresses 
each stage of the technology innovation cycle.  
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The technology development cycle depicted in Figure 4 is basically a linear sequence from basic 
research and development (R&D) to the widespread diffusion of a commercially mature technol-
ogy throughout society. However, there is no agreement on the best way to define such sequential 
“phases” of innovation. Figure 5 illustrates the various terminology that are commonly used in 
the literature.  
 
Figure.5  Overview of different concepts of technological maturity and phases of technol-
ogy development and innovation used in the literature.  
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Source: UNFCCC (2008a) adapted from Arrow (1962a; 1962b); Schumpeter (1939); Schmookler (1966); Hayami and 
Ruttan (1985); Grubb (2005); Arthur (2006); IPCC (2005); Sandén and Azar (2005). 
 
In this dissertation, the categories that are used are ‘research and development’ (R&D), ‘demon-
stration’, ‘deployment’, and ‘diffusion’.  
 
To categorise technologies by their stage of technological maturity as the basis for undertaking 
the analysis of financing of technology in different stages of maturity, a typology of technological 
maturity needs to be established that is based on the barriers that technologies experience and that 
corresponds with the risks faced by the private sector in making investments in technology 
(UNEP-SEFI, 2002; UNFCCC, 2008a). This is convenient because it provides a conceptual link 
between technology maturity, barriers to finance and deployment, the main types of finance and 
financial support that technologies may require, the types of public policies and investment 
strategies that can be applied to stimulate innovation and the extent to which these policies and 
investments are able to leverage private sector investment.  
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The typology of technology maturity and the relationship between each stage and the factors 
listed above are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Types of barriers, main types of finance, types of policies and leveraging poten-
tial by stage of technological maturity  
 
Stage of technological 
maturity 
Types of barriers Main types 
of finance 
Types of 
policies 
Leveraging 
potential 
R&D Proof of concept, 
technical, scale, cost, 
economic, social, in-
stitutional 
Grant-based 
finance, fiscal 
incentives, 
equity (seed 
capital) 
Joint R&D 
programmes, 
tax incen-
tives, grant 
programmes 
Low 
Demonstration Scale, cost, eco-
nomic, social, institu-
tional 
Grant-based 
finance, fiscal 
incentives, 
equity (seed 
capital and 
venture capi-
tal) 
Tax incen-
tives, grant 
programmes 
Low 
Deployment 
Cost of the technology 
exceeds that of the in-
cumbent technology by 
more than the marginal 
or incremental cost of 
the emission reductions 
Cost, economic, so-
cial, institutional, 
market transaction 
costs 
Grant-based 
finance, fiscal 
incentives, 
equity (ven-
ture capital, 
private eq-
uity) 
Production 
subsidies, 
feed-in tariffs, 
deployment 
targets, tax 
credits, public 
venture capi-
tal funds, re-
moval of per-
verse subsi-
dies 
Low-Medium 
Diffusion 
Cost of the technology 
exceeds that of the in-
cumbent technology by 
less than the marginal 
or incremental cost of 
the emission reductions 
Economic, social, in-
stitutional, market 
transaction costs 
Fiscal incen-
tives, private 
equity, debt 
Technology 
standards, 
emission 
trading 
schemes, 
green loan 
programmes, 
green bonds, 
removal of 
perverse 
subsidies 
Medium-High 
 
Source: adapted from UNEP-SEFI (2002); UNEP (2008a), UNFCCC (2008a;b), IEA policy database (2010). 
 
The dissertation follows the same approach that was adopted by the UNFCCC (2009a) in its 
analysis of current and future financing needs and in its use of the technology innovation cycle. 
The UNFCCC used the following diagram (Figure 6), adapted from Stern et al., (2006) to illus-
trate the way learning and experience curves and costs interact with incumbent, commercial tech-
nologies. This diagram is also useful in regard to understanding the relative leveraging effects of 
public policies and investments at each stage of the technology innovation cycle.  
 
Page 24 of 94 
Figure 6  Technology learning curves and how the costs of new technologies and the time 
that it takes for new technologies to become competitive can be reduced through 
a combination of accelerated R&D programmes, technology demonstration pro-
grammes, deployment support measures, carbon prices and diffusion support 
measures.  
 
  
Source: UNFCCC (2009a) adapted from Stern, et al., (2006). 
 
The leveraging potential of public policies and investments that target technologies across the in-
novation cycle also tend to follow a typical pattern consistent with trends in the incremental costs 
illustrated in Figure 6, where the shaded portion of the graph indicates the marginal or incre-
mental costs of climate change mitigation technologies. Figure 6 illustrates how public interven-
tions can reduce the cost of technologies, but it also illustrates how these policies can increase the 
potential to leverage private sector investment in technologies at the various stages of maturity. 
At the R&D, demonstration and deployment stages the risks for the private sector are great, and 
public policies find it difficult to leverage private investment. The average leveraging ratios 
achieved for each stage of technological maturity are reviewed in detail in Chapter 7, however the 
general trend is illustrated in Figure 717
                                                 
17 The diagram represents the overall relationships, however, there are exceptions to the rule. In practice there is a range 
of leveraging ratios achieved at each stage of the technology innovation cycle, which is presented in detail in Chapter 7. 
For example, in some cases leveraging ratios in the medium range have been found for research and development and 
demonstration technologies, and leveraging ratios in the high range have been found for technologies in the deployment 
stage.  
.  
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Figure 7.  Theoretical relationship between the proportion of private sector investment re-
quired, the leveraging ratios that can be achieved by public policies and invest-
ments and the stages of technological maturity.  
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Source: Author’s Diagram based on UNFCCC (2009b) and NEF and UNEP-SEFI (2008). Note: Low is estimated as a 
range from 1:0.5–1:3; Medium is estimated as a range from 1:3–1:1:10; High is estimated as a range from 1:10–1:100.  
4.2 Types of finance and leveraging 
To maximise the leveraging potential of public policies and investment programmes, it is essen-
tial that the types of finance offered match the various needs of the private sector. It is useful to 
focus on major gaps or bottlenecks that prevent the flow of private financing. Financing needs 
can vary significantly over time, by technology and by country, and public policies need to be re-
sponsive to these changing circumstances.  
 
There are many different types of financing that can be applied to a climate change technology 
project or programme, however, in general there are three main types of finance: equity, mezza-
nine and debt finance (Rogers, 2009). Public policy and investment programmes can stimulate 
and directly make available different types of finance to target gaps in the availability of finance 
for particular technologies with the aim of leveraging greater private sector investment.  
 
Figure 8 illustrates the characteristics of each type of finance. 
 
Page 26 of 94 
Figure 8  Characteristics of the major types of finance 
 
Source: Author’s diagram derived from Rogers (2009) and Hamilton (2009). 
 
Public financing mechanisms can be tailored to address each type of finance. Measures that aim 
to support early stage technology development tend to be equity-based financial instruments, 
mezzanine financing is particularly suited to assist in the commercialisation of technologies, and 
debt financing instruments are often applied to low risk technologies and are suited to deployment 
and diffusion of technologies (Coogan, et al., 2007). An example of the later is the World Bank’s 
Climate Change Bond which was first issued in November 2008 and after four issues of bonds the 
instrument has raised approximately USD 1 billion for investment in climate change mitigation 
projects in developing countries (World Bank, 2010a). These types of initiatives are particularly 
important in the context of the state of the financial markets in the period 2007–2010 and the 
need to ensure the growth in climate change investments.  
 
Firms often acquire much more complex financing arrangements than this general typology of 
finance suggests. The European Union (EU) FUNDATEC project undertook an extensive survey 
of technology developers in 2007 to determine what sources of finance are most commonly used 
(Coogan, et al., 2007). Technology developers in Europe, Asia and the United States were sur-
veyed. The frequency with which technology developers identified different financial sources is 
presented in Figure 9. The horizontal axis shows the number of responses within the survey to the 
use of particular types of finance. 
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Figure 9  Types of technology by stage of technological maturity 
 
Source: Coogan et al., (2007); Abbreviations: R&D = research and development. Note: the R&D and Proof of Concept 
stages in this diagram are assumed to be the equivalent of the R&D stage used by UNFCCC (2009b); pre-
commercialisation is assumed to be the deployment stage used by UNFCCC (2009b); commercialisation is assumed to 
be the diffusion stage used by the UNFCCC (2009b).  
 
A company will typically attempt to finance its operations with a maximum of debt financing be-
cause this will allow the company to minimise the cost of finance, and to maximise its ongoing 
control of the company and the amount of revenue that it will retain for future development of the 
company. However, debt financing may be difficult to obtain due to the inherent risks involved in 
new technologies or new companies (NEF and UNEP-SEFI, 2008).  
 
As Figure 9 shows, companies in the early stages of development are heavily dependent upon 
government grants, seed capital (from public and private investors) and the own personal funds of 
the technology developer. As a company takes its technology closer to commercialisation, ven-
ture capital and private equity financing becomes more common, and then in the commercial 
stage, debt financing tends to dominate.  
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5 The enabling environment: a prerequisite for public  
leveraging of private investment 
At its very basic level, effective action on any challenging national policy issue, such as climate 
change, requires a stable political environment, the rule of law, suitable national policies and 
regulations, and the human capacities within that nation to undertake the necessary tasks. Equally 
important is the international context, such as the presence of fair trading policies, supportive in-
ternational monetary and aid policy, and access to institutions and support to take action18
                                                 
18 Relevant data is available in the World Bank’s online World Business Environment Survey 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/index.html) and the World Bank’s online Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors database (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp), last accessed 04/2010. 
.  
 
It is widely agreed that the appropriate enabling environment and market conditions will dramati-
cally improve the effectiveness of an intervention and that there is a need for targeted measures 
that improve the enabling conditions for investments in climate technology (IPCC, 2000). Any 
public policy that attempts to leverage greater private sector investment will be hamstrung with-
out concomitant public investments in the enabling environment.  
 
Therefore, the financial aspects of technology development and transfer which are the focus of 
this dissertation must be considered within this broader context of the barriers to financing tech-
nologies in developing countries. While this dissertation does not directly address the question of 
enabling environments, it is clear that it must be a key component of any strategy to increase pub-
lic sector leveraging of private sector investment. The UNFCCC defines enabling environments 
as, “fair trade policies, removal of technical, legal and administrative barriers to technology trans-
fer, sound economic policy, regulatory frameworks and transparency, all of which create an envi-
ronment conducive to private and public sector technology transfer” (UNFCCC, 2003, pg. 7).  
 
For many developing countries, even with suitable national policy frameworks, the domestic pri-
vate sector is not sufficiently developed and there is a reliance on foreign investment and exper-
tise to advance essential national development interests, including the implementation of climate 
change policies. The ability of a country to attract private capital and to benefit from the foreign 
investment that is made is crucial for national economic development. An understanding of the 
international patterns of private financing is instructive for understanding how enabling environ-
ments are crucial pre-requisite for public policies that aim to leverage private sector investment to 
address climate change.  
 
Figure 10 presents the overall structure of global private sector financial flows.  
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Figure 10 Schematic illustration of global private capital flows  
 
Source: Author’s diagram based on the description in UNFCCC (2007a). 
 
Broadly, private finance can be classified into two categories: domestic capital and foreign capital 
flows. Domestic capital may come from three principal sources: private investors, public capital 
markets and commercial banks. The capacity of these capital providers/markets, to some degree, 
is determined by the level of economic development of the country (Carmody and Ritchie, 2007). 
The ability to raise funds for clean energy on public capital markets in developing countries, for 
example, depends on the existence of such a market in the country.  
 
Private investment in clean energy assets that originates in another country would be categorized 
as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI represented 22 per cent of current global investments by 
private corporations in 2007 (United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), 2008). As illustrated in Figure 10, in general the flow of FDI between developed 
countries is much greater than flows of FDI to developed countries. However, while this general 
trend holds true, closer observation at a regional-scale shows significant differences in the level 
of foreign investment by country. The World Bank’s World Development Report consistently 
shows that FDI tends to flow to those countries where relatively strong enabling conditions for 
investment exist (World Bank, 2010b, pg. 295). For this reason, public policy mechanisms that 
attempt to leverage private sector investment must be accompanied and preferably preceded with 
investments in the legislative, policy and institutional arrangements that support investment 
(OECD, 2009b). If this is not possible, then the potential to leverage private finance will be dimi-
nished and the need for public financing will be greater.  
 
A key enabling environment issue affecting the ability of public policies and investment pro-
grammes to leverage private sector investment is the extent of public subsidies directed towards 
existing greenhouse gas emission intensive technologies and fuels. UNEP (2008b, pg. 11) esti-
mates that fossil fuel subsidies could be in the order of USD 300 billion per annum, although 
country by country analysis has not been conducted. When this figure is compared with the  
USD 262–670 billion per annum of additional finance needed for mitigation (see Chapter 6, be-
low), it is clear that even partial elimination of perverse subsidies could go a long way to address-
ing the financing gap, particularly if those subsidies can be redirected to low emission technolo-
gies. Indeed, the Group of 20 (G20) declared in 2009 to make significant progress on the elimina-
tion of perverse subsidies in the context of climate change (G20, 2009).  
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The performance of the CDM also demonstrates that public financing mechanisms are not effec-
tive in leveraging private sector investment unless a suitable investment climate is present. In 
2006, Jung undertook a cluster analysis of countries based on their investment climate and found 
a significant correlation with the geographical distribution of CDM projects. CDM projects tend 
to be concentrated in a few countries with attractive investment conditions, and the number of 
projects declines significantly for countries that do not possess the necessary institutional and le-
gal systems or where perceived political or economic risks are high. Interest rate risks can be a 
significant barrier to investment. Schneider et al., (2008) demonstrate that these correlations con-
tinue to persist (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 Correlation between investment attractiveness and number of CDM projects  
 
Country Number of CDM  
projects (a) 
Composite indicator 
of investment  
attractiveness (b) 
Point Carbon  
investment ranking (c) 
India 596 1 2 
China 397 2 1 
Brazil 221 3 5 
Mexico 152 4 4 
Malaysia 42 15 6 
Chile 31 5 3 
Thailand 28 12 16 
Korea 28 13 9 
Indonesia 21 57 11 
South Africa 17 8 8 
Peru 16 26 7 
Argentina 13 11 12 
Vietnam 10 22 13 
Morocco 5 6 10 
Egypt 5 35 15 
(a) Pueyo Velasco (2007)  
(b) Oleschak and Springer (2007)  
(c) Point Carbon (2007)  
 
Source: Schneider et al., (2007). 
 
There is a trend toward the preparation and implementation of national low emission develop-
ment strategies in developing countries that address both the underlying conditions necessary to 
leverage private sector investment (the enabling environment) and also the gaps in the availability 
of public financing linked with a commitment from developed countries to provide the necessary 
financial support. The remainder of this dissertation focuses on the leveraging potential of indi-
vidual public policies and investment programmes, however, the need for this integrated approach 
must be underlined, as it provides a more effective means of addressing the financing gap identi-
fied in Chapter 6 below.  
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6 The financing gap 
Estimates of the financing gap that needs to be addressed to shift the world towards a low green-
house gas emissions economy have been prepared by UNFCCC (2007a; 2008a; 2009a;b), synthe-
sising a wide range of estimates in the literature. There is undoubtedly a large gap that exists 
across all technologies, all stages of technological maturity and all regions of the world, as illus-
trated in Figure 11. In this figure the financing gap is the ‘additional’ finance that is required. The 
term ‘low’ on the horizontal axis refers to the low end of the estimate range and the term ‘high’ 
on the horizontal axis refers to the high end of the estimate range.  
 
Figure 11 Summary of the financing gap by stage of technological maturity (incremental 
costs as defined in Figure 6, above) 
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Source: UNFCCC (2009b). 
 
The assessment of the financing gap is based on estimates of financing currently available and 
financing needs to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 500–550 ppm  
CO2-e. The estimates of financing needs also assume that all of the operational costs that are 
saved by introducing clean technologies (such as the fuel costs saved by switching from oil or 
coal to solar or wind technologies) are captured. Operational saving may be captured over the life 
of an investment, however, the up-front investment costs can present a more significant challenge 
for public policies and investment programmes seeking to leverage private sector investment.  
 
As UNFCCC (2009b) explains:  
 
In terms of additional capital costs, the IEA in its Energy Technology Perspectives re-
ports investment needs in the diffusion phase of up to USD 1,100 billion annually, as an 
average over the years 2010–2050. For diffusion in developing countries, USD 660 per 
year would be required based on an investment share of 60 per cent for developing coun-
tries and 40 per cent for developed countries, as estimated by the IEA (2008a, pg. 240). 
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Furthermore, the IEA estimates that USD 100–200 billion per year is required globally in 
early deployment costs, 60 per cent of which would be required in developing countries.  
 
Indeed analysis for the OECD by IEA staff shows the potential for costs to increase to 5600 bil-
lion annually should significant technology development prospects fail or if key policy mecha-
nisms are ineffective (Doornbosch et al., 2008). Figure 12 presents the same data used by the 
UNFCCC in Figure 11, based on up front investment costs rather than incremental costs. As a 
comparison between figures 11 and 12 shows, the major difference is in the diffusion stage. 
Within this stage it is the investment costs associated with the transport sector, and particularly 
advanced vehicles, which dominate. These vehicles are much more fuel efficient, and over their 
lifetimes the increased up front capital costs are compensated with reduced running costs (IEA, 
2008a).  
 
Figure 12 Summary of the financing gap by stage of technological maturity (up front in-
vestment costs) 
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Source: Author’s estimates based on UNFCCC (2009b) and IEA (2008a) 
 
Unless otherwise stated, throughout this dissertation the figures used for the analysis of leverag-
ing ratios are the incremental costs. While the investment cost reflects the initial hurdle for fi-
nancing mitigation technologies, the public financing mechanisms assessed in this dissertation are 
designed so that businesses can structure their financing to take account of the higher up front 
capital costs of mitigation technologies with lower operational costs. The types of finance used 
for this purpose are discussed in section 4.2 of this dissertation. Each technology, project and 
business situation is unique in regard to the mix of capital and operating costs, revenues, equity 
and debt. This necessitates a mix of the types of finance and the use of innovative concessional 
financing tools by public policy and public investment programmes. It is also a reason for the 
need for a portfolio of public policy and public financing mechanisms which are tailored to ad-
dress specific situations or needs.  
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Section 6.1 below discusses a more detailed breakdown of the estimates of the current level of 
financing for climate change mitigation technologies, and section 6.2 presents detailed informa-
tion on the future financing needs.  
6.1 Current financing for climate change mitigation technologies 
It is useful to obtain a picture of the current state of financing for climate change technologies in 
order to understand the scale of the financing challenge and to study the effectiveness of various 
instruments currently being employed to leverage additional finance from the private sector. 
 
Financing for climate change mitigation technologies is dominated by private sources of finance, 
but those private investments are heavily dependent upon public investments that cover the mar-
ginal (or additional) costs of mitigation technologies and the policy frameworks that provide the 
necessary incentives and market conditions that enable investment (UNFCCC, 2009a; NEF and 
UNEP-SEFI, 2008).  
 
Table 4 shows current investment in mitigation technologies by source of finance and by stage of 
technological maturity.  
 
Table 4  Estimates of current financing for mitigation technologies by stage of  
technological maturity and source (billions of United States dollars per year) 
 
 
R&D 
(total 
spending) 
Demonstration 
(total spend-
ing) 
Deployment 
(additional cost of cli-
mate technologies) 
Diffusion 
(additional cost of cli-
mate technologies) Total 
Global Global Global 
Developing 
countries Global 
Developing 
countries Global 
Public 6
a 
10b 
Partially in-
cluded with 
R&D 
33c 
45d 
30e 
NA 19.5–27.0f 8.0–15.5g 55.5–82.0 
Private 
At least 9.8h 
13a 
40–60i 
Partially in-
cluded with 
R&D 
NA NA 12–22h 3.3h 21.8–82.0 
Total 15.8–70 
Partially in-
cluded with 
R&D 
30–45 NA 31.5–49 11.3–18.8 77.3–164.0 
Source: UNFCCC (2009a); Abbreviations: NA = not available, R&D = research and development. 
a Based on 2 per cent share of global R&D of USD 1,000 billion in 2006. 
b IEA (2008c). 
c Stern, et al., (2007, pg. 347). 
d Doornbosch R, et al., (2008, pg. 5). 
e UNFCCC (2007a). 
f This estimate is the sum of financing for mitigation technologies provided by the clean development mechanism 
(CDM), joint implementation, bilateral official development assistance (ODA), multilateral development banks 
(MDBs), export credit agencies (ECAs) and by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), plus the New Energy Finance 
estimate of investment in carbon funds for the purchase of emissions permits in compliance and voluntary markets in 
2007. It is assumed that most GEF, bilateral ODA, MDB and ECA financing is additional; however, this is not al-
ways the case. 
g Signifies all items included in the global amount except the investment in carbon funds for the purchase of emissions           
permits. 
h UNEP and NEF (2008). Based on NEF data. Estimates of the additional portion of the private investment for energy 
efficiency and low carbon investments in the energy sector. Additional investment is the premium in excess of the in-
vestment required for conventional technologies that provide comparable services. Based on data for the GEF and the 
CDM the additional portion of the investment is 15 per cent of the total investment.  
i IEA (2008a). This figure includes some unspecified investments at the demonstration stage. 
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The majority of the current financing (approximately 94 per cent) for climate change mitigation 
technologies occurs outside of the Convention (see UNFCCC, 2009a, Table 5). This has implica-
tions for the ability of an international climate change agreement to increase the leveraging of 
private sector investment because the influence of the Convention on these non-Convention 
sources of finance is very limited.  
 
Nonetheless, the UNFCCC will at least have a tacit or indirect impact on domestic decisions of 
national governments and the policies and financing mechanisms outside of the Convention, and 
in general, these non-Convention institutions are also motivated and committed to increasing the 
level of financing and in particular to increase the extent of private sector financing for climate 
change.  
 
The Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2007b, paragraph 1 (b)(ii)) envisaged that under the Convention 
actions of national governments would be measurable, reportable and verifiable, and that through 
this mechanism of accountability to the COP, some influence may be gained on the policies and 
financing mechanisms of national governments and entities such as the international financial in-
stitutions.  
6.2 Estimates of financing needs for climate change mitigation 
technologies 
Many reports and studies have provide estimates of the financing needed for individual technolo-
gies and groups of technologies19
 
. Most studies do not provide detailed information on incre-
mental investment for the full spectrum of technologies for mitigation and adaptation. Estimates 
of the additional financing needed to achieve the projected implementation of specified mitigation 
technologies can be derived from models and mitigation cost curves. These estimates are shown 
grouped by stage of technological maturity in Table 5. The additional finance needs are estimated 
to be between USD 262–670 billion annually, averaged from 2010–2050. Consequently the total 
level of investment (i.e., including current investment) required annually is USD 332–835 billion 
annually. 
                                                 
19 See references in Table 5, below.  
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Table 5 Financing for Mitigation Technologies by Stage of Technological Maturity  
(billions of United States dollars per year) 
 
 
 
R&D 
(total  
spending) 
Demonstration 
(total  
spending) 
Deployment 
(additional cost of  
climate technologies) 
Diffusion 
(additional cost of  
climate technologies) Total 
Global Global Global 
Developing 
countries Global 
Developing 
countries Global 
Current 
total 15.8–70 NA 30–45 NA 31.5–49 11.3–18.8 77.3–164 
Additional 
financing 
needed 
50a 
20–100b 
10c 
 
27–36d 
 
57–94e 
25–35f 
 
10–38.5g 
 
250–440h 
200–210j 
 
150–264h 
82–180g 
 
262–670 
Total 25.8–170 At least 27–36 55–139 
At least  
10–38.5  231.5–489 93.3–282.8 339.3–834 
Source: based on UNFCCC (2009b); Abbreviations: NA = not available, R&D = research and development. 
Note: The “Current Total” row is taken from table 4 of this dissertation. 
a Stern, et al., (2006, pg. 371). Public finance only. 
b Doornbosch, et al., (2008, pg.5). 
c UNFCCC (2007a, pg. 7). Public finance only. 
d Calculated from demonstration costs estimated in: International Energy Agency (2008a, Chapter 3).  
e UNFCCC (2007a, pg. 90). 
f UNFCCC (2007a, pg. 6). 
g The level of investment required in developing countries is calculated using the same investment share as estimated by 
the UNFCCC secretariat, which is 40.9 per cent in developing countries and 59.1 per cent in developed countries 
(UNFCCC, 2007a, pg. 214, annex V, table 4). 
h McKinsey (2009, pg. 8 and pg. 17). 
 
Estimates of financing needs are derived from models of the economy which attempt to simulate 
how greenhouse gas emissions may respond to pre-defined scenarios for economic development 
and the deployment of technologies that would reduce emissions from a business as usual sce-
nario (Rosenberg, 1982; IEA, 2008b; UNFCCC, 2009a). The models make assumptions regard-
ing the costs and rate of deployment of low emission technologies. They also assume that certain 
least cost climate change policies are introduced in developed and developing countries and that 
the costs of introducing new technologies respond to assumed learning curves, where costs de-
cline as the technology becomes more commonly deployed. The main model used to arrive at cost 
estimates in this dissertation the Energy Technology Perspectives Model and the World Energy 
Model (IEA, 2008a; 2008b) of the IEA, which have been supplemented to incorporate emissions 
reductions options in non-energy sectors of the economy (industry, agriculture and forestry) by 
the UNFCCC (2007a; 2009a). Detailed information on the assumptions in these models and the 
methodological approach in estimating investment needs is contained in UNFCCC (2007a). The 
same definitions and assumptions used in the UNFCCC study are applied in this dissertation.  
 
An important policy assumption contained within the IEA modelling is that a global emissions 
trading scheme is introduced by 2020 and that the largest emitting developing countries partici-
pate in this scheme. The IEA also assumes that a large share of the abatement task is delivered 
through energy efficiency, which has a negative cost. Underlying assumptions have important 
consequences for studying the public and private shares of investment costs.  
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There is potential for costs to be underestimated. For example, if a global emissions trading 
scheme is not introduced the overall costs of abatement will increase because the policies and 
measures needed are likely to deliver a higher total cost of abatement. Furthermore, if all energy 
efficiency investments are not realised because non-financial barriers prevent their adoption, the 
overall investment costs will increase because more expensive abatement options will be needed. 
It is also necessary to take into account the risks of policy failure and slower than expected reduc-
tions in the costs of key technologies which will also increase total abatement costs.  
 
On the other hand, there is good reason to expect that the modelling results overestimate the costs 
of addressing climate change. The models used are not well suited to simulating the economic 
benefits that accrue from investments in climate change technologies and as such they tend to fo-
cus on the up front investment costs that are required. However, these up front cost will be re-
duced over time by the benefits that accrue, such as the growth in markets, energy security or job 
creation benefits, that is to the extent that they can be made additional (Barker, et al., 2006; 
2009). Furthermore, difficult to model or intangible benefits such as the reduced costs and im-
pacts of adaptation to climate change or the reductions in air pollution and health costs and im-
pacts that result from investments in climate change technologies are not included in the IEA 
models. So in this regard the IEA estimates will tend to inflate the costs associated with address-
ing climate change.  
 
Ex-post evaluations of economic models and their projections of costs to address environmental 
issues have found that they have over-estimated investment needs. For example, the actual costs 
of addressing ozone layer depletion under the Montreal Protocol were found to be only 13 per 
cent of forecast costs, and the actual costs of addressing sulphur dioxide in the US were found to 
be just 6 per cent of the forecast costs (McKinsey and Co, 2008). A study of the costs of envi-
ronmental regulations in the European Union (Oosterhuis, 2006) found that a majority of ex-ante 
economic evaluations over-estimated costs by at least a factor of two. This suggests that estimates 
of investment needs for climate change may also be inflated. Of course only time will tell.  
 
As mentioned above, cost of abatement curves can also be used to study the costs of abatement 
opportunities and the relative costs of various technologies. It is not possible to compare mod-
elled investment needs with cost of abatement studies because the metrics used are not consistent, 
however, they do provide a different and useful perspective on overall relative technology and 
abatement costs.  
 
The data from cost of abatement curves (e.g. Vattenfall, 2007; UNFCCC, 2008c) show how the 
public and private cost ratio of different technologies and abatement opportunities can differ sub-
stantially. For example, hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) projects have investment ratios an order of 
magnitude less than renewable energy projects. Similarly, energy efficiency projects have low 
leverage ratios because the investment costs are relatively small compared to the carbon financing 
that can be attracted. Capoor and Ambrosi (2007; 2008) reviewed the World Bank portfolio of 
carbon investments and found that leveraging ratios for HFC projects are in the order of 1:2, 
energy efficiency is in the order of 1:2–5 and renewable energy projects can leverage in the order 
of 1:8–11. Similar leveraging ratio estimates have been prepared in a comprehensive review of 
CDM projects by Seres and Haites (2008). 
 
These differences illustrate how in general, emissions trading schemes that are designed to be 
able to maximise investment in low cost abatement opportunities such as energy efficiency 
throughout the economy, are likely to have lower leverage ratios yet achieve better overall per-
formance, whereas renewable energy standards are likely to have higher investment ratios but re-
sults in lower overall levels of abatement.  
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It is important to bear these issues in mind when examining the leveraging effect of policies. As 
argued in Chapter 5, detailed accounting rules and procedures are needed if leveraging ratios are 
to be used for comparing the effectiveness of specific policies. However, a careful aggregate 
analysis of leveraging as a measure of the public and private shares of investment needs is useful 
for decision makers. Such an approach can help to base decisions concerning the financial burden 
Annex II nations should accept and can help inform decisions on the extent to which new ‘off 
budget’ revenue raising mechanisms will be needed, such as the auctioning of Assigned Amount 
Units or various levies and auctioning mechanisms proposed by Parties.  
6.3 Institutional and policy gaps in global financing for climate 
change  
There are two fundamental over-riding factors that influence the financing of climate change 
technologies. Together these factors form the basis of a functioning global carbon market that can 
stimulate a flow of finance from the private sector to meet the incremental costs of low emission 
technologies.  
 
The first is the creation of a global carbon price to internalise the cost of carbon emissions such 
that they increase to the full the social cost of carbon over time (Stern, et al., 2006). The IEA 
(2008a) estimate that carbon prices will need to be in the order of USD 180 in 2030 to be on a tra-
jectory to achieve a halving of global emissions by 2050.  
 
The second and directly related factor requires binding emissions reductions targets by developed 
countries and measurable, reportable and verifiable actions that limit emissions in developing 
countries20
• accelerate technology development and transfer in order to lower the cost of mitigation 
and to achieve the emission reductions that will be necessary in the long-term (Stern, et 
al., 2006, Part III); and  
. These targets are vital for creating the demand for the investments in technologies 
and abatement options. Emissions reductions should be consistent with the science of climate 
change to avoid large social, economic and environmental costs of adaptation to climate change.  
 
However, the creation of a global carbon market will be insufficient to address the challenge of 
financing the shift to a low greenhouse gas emission economy. As explained by the Stern Review 
(Stern, et al., 2006) government intervention is required both to:  
• address market failures and remove barriers to low emission technologies and invest-
ments (Stern, et al., 2006, Part IV).  
 
Work undertaken within the London School of Economics (Romani, 2009, pg. 6) addressed a key 
related question: “How scarce public funds can be used efficiently and innovatively to leverage 
private sector flows for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries whilst carbon markets 
are in the early stages of development”. The suggest four key dimensions to addressing this ques-
tion: 
1. Public financial instruments to raise finances; 
2. Public financial mechanism that mobilise finance and create markets;  
3. Increasing the flow, scale and quality of proposals for financing policies, programmes 
and projects; and 
4. Overall design of the global financial architecture for climate finance. 
                                                 
20 Recognising the principle of common but differentiated responsiblities and capabilities, Article 3, paragraph (1) of 
the Convention. 
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Sections 6.3.1–6.3.4 below considers each of the areas listed above as identified by Romani  
et al., (2009). Then the key gaps in financing for each stage of the technology innovation cycle 
are summarised in section 6.3.5.  
6.3.1 Public financing instruments to raise finances 
There are two primary ways that international institutions and national governments can raise fi-
nancing for climate change. The first involves governments raising finance through taxes21
Proposal 
. The 
second involves raising finance through debt. UNFCCC (2009b, pg. 97) has focused on the for-
mer, as shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6.  Options for raising revenue to finance technology development and transfer ac-
tivities under the Convention (billions of United States dollars)  
 
Source of funding Purpose Notes 
Nominal annual 
level of funding 
Increasing the scale of existing mechanisms 
European Union Continue 2 per cent levy on SoP 
from CDM 
A Ranging from low 
to high demand in 
2020 
0.2–0.68 
Bangladesh, 
Pakistan 
3–5 per cent levy on SoP from 
CDM 
A Ranging from low 
to high demand in 
2020 
0.3–1.7 
Many Parties CDM and other crediting mecha-
nism  
M In 2020 10–34  
 
Defined budgetary contributions from developed countries 
Group of 77 
and China 
0.5–1 per cent of GNP of Annex 
I Partiesa 
A, M Calculated for 
2007 GDP 
201–402 
Contributions raised through market-based mechanisms and taxation 
Mexico Contributions based on GDP, 
GHG and population and possi-
bly auctioning permits in devel-
oped countries 
A, M Initial phase 10 
Norway 2 per cent auctioning of AAUs A Annually 15–25 
Switzerland 2 USD per t CO2 with a basic tax 
exemption of 1.5 t CO2 eq per 
inhabitant  
A Annually 18.4 
Republic of Ko-
rea 
Crediting NAMAs M  Uncertain 
Colombia, LDCs 2 per cent levy on SoP from joint 
implementation and emissions 
trading 
A Annually, after 
2012 
0.03–2.25 
LDCs Levy on international air travel 
(IATAL) 
A, M Annually 4–10 
LDCs Levy on bunker fuels (IMERS) A Annually 4–15 
Tuvalu Auction of allowances for inter-
national aviation and marine 
emissions 
A, M Annually 28 
Sources: UNFCCC (2009b) after UNFCCC (2007a; 2008d; 2008f)) and Müller (2008). 
Abbreviations: A = adaptation, AAU = assigned amount unit, CDM = clean development mechanism, GDP = gross 
domestic product, GHG = greenhouse gas, GNP = gross national product, IATAL = International Air Travel Adapta-
tion Levy, IMERS = International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme, LDCs = least developed countries,  
M = mitigation, NAMAs = nationally appropriate mitigation actions, SoP = share of proceeds.  
a Owing to a lack of information on GNP, potential funding was calculated using GDP 
                                                 
21 In the case of international institutions such as the UNFCCC, it has been suggested that Parties could agree to raise 
finances through assessed contributions from national governments, which would ultimately flow from governments 
taxes and levies. 
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Table 6 shows that only the proposal of the Group of 77 and China is capable of raising sufficient 
funds to address the financing needs for climate change as reported in section 6.2, above. The ne-
gotiations on finance under the Convention leading up to COP 15 in Copenhagen clearly demon-
strated the unwillingness of developed countries to accept a model for raising finance predomi-
nantly based on public finance. Instead they propose arrangements that rely mostly on private fi-
nance (UNFCCC, 2008b). Developed countries are willing to accept some proportion of public 
financing being raised based on a formula that would define the burden sharing arrangement (as 
is currently the case with the replenishment of the GEF), but this would be only on the basis of a 
‘pledge and review’ arrangement, rather than the mandatory approach proposed by the Group of 
77 and China. Such an arrangement is unlikely to lead to a stable and predictable flow of finance. 
As the International Monitory Fund (IMF, 2010, pg. 5) notes the “traditional approach to raising 
new development finance — a succession of donor conferences and pledging sessions — has a 
checkered history. Concrete pledges tend to have short horizons, while delivery on longer-term 
commitments tends to fall well short of what was promised.”22
The IMF (2010) has proposed a fund structure based on so called ‘green bonds’ which would be 
capable of providing a steady flow of both grants to developing countries (particularly for adapta-
tion) and a mix of different concessional financial instruments based on the special drawing rights 
of developed country nations held by the IMF. This proposal would see a mix of USD 40 billion 
in loans and USD 60 billion in subsidies to developing countries. However, the structure of this 
arrangement would see developing countries take an equity stake in the fund, and would most 
  
 
These concerns and limitations have led many to pursue public financing instruments that are 
based on debt as an alternative to those that require flows of revenue from national governments.  
 
Romani et al., (2009) focus on bonds as the debt-based tool of choice to raise capital for climate 
change. A bond is essentially a loan that a government takes out with the purchaser of the bond. 
The bond is secured against the capital assets of the nation state. As Romani, et al., (2009) de-
scribe there are many different bond structures and designs that respond to the purpose for which 
they are to be used, as well as the political context in which they are created. Large-scale issuance 
of bonds can create large financial and political risks for governments which requires them to 
take a direct stake in the investments being made. Therefore bonds tend to create a direct incen-
tive for governments to ensure that the regulatory framework is in place to ensure the bond 
mechanism achieves an optimal outcome. If bonds are structured so that their issuance is directly 
related to the returns from investments made in previous issuances, then the impact on govern-
ment budgets can be minimised.  
 
One of the major problems with using green bonds as a primary means of raising finance is the 
reliance on concessional financing that it creates. The debt must be serviced and this either comes 
from government budgets or from the returns on investment from the bonds. To ensure that public 
debt is being used wisely the projects, programmes or policies for which bonds are being used to 
finance must be heavily scrutinised. Developing countries on the other hand reject any strong 
oversight on the actions that they take to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change. 
From a developing country perspective, developed countries are legally obliged to provide direct 
and untied transfers of finance as a form of compensation for historical emissions and to enable 
developing countries to make the transition to a low emission economy (see Müller, 2009).  
 
                                                 
22 See also the review of finding commitments made by the European Union (Pallemaerts and Armstrong, 2009) which 
shows that it is far from meeting its pledge in 2001 to provide USD 369 million as part of the Bonn declaration 
(UNFCCC, 2001). 
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likely require them to dominate the governance of such a fund, which would be unacceptable to 
developing countries who have insisted in balanced regional representation in any governance ar-
rangement for climate financing (see G77 and China, 2008).  
6.3.2 Public financing mechanisms: The need for public venture capital 
NEF and UNEP-SEFI (2008) have identified two important gaps in the early stages of venture 
capital financing as technologies move from the R&D to the demonstration stage, and beyond to 
reach the deployment stage. Venture capital and private equity financing are crucial during these 
stages due to the high risks still inherent in the technologies and the businesses that are bringing 
them to the market.  
 
The gaps in venture capital financing are illustrated in Figure 13 and are quantified in Figure 14. 
These estimates are based on total investment costs as per IEA (2008a) rather than the incre-
mental costs provided by UNFCCC (2009b). Note that in these global figures, regional distribu-
tion of venture capital and private equity finance is heavily biased to the United States, which 
possesses the most mature venture capital and private equity markets. Outside of the US there is 
very little early stage venture capital financing, and in developing countries, this type of financing 
is almost entirely absent.  
 
Figure 13 Gaps in early stage venture capital financing for climate change mitigation tech-
nologies.  
 
 
Source: Adapted from NEF and UNEP-SEFI (2008). 
 
Research and Development 
Deployment and Diffusion 
Page 41 of 94 
Figure 14 Volumes of venture capital and private equity financing illustrating the growth in 
later stage venture capital and private equity and the very limited availability of 
early stage finance for climate change mitigation technologies.  
 
Source: NEF and UNEP-SEFI (2008). 
 
As shown in Figure 14, the level of early stage venture capital has not grown significantly since 
2001. Analysis by UNEP has demonstrated the need for public sector venture capital financing 
tools to fill these gaps due to the reluctance of private sector to bear the significant risks associ-
ated with early stage financing (NEF and UNEP-SEFI, 2008).  
 
Figure 15 estimates the increase in venture capital and private equity financing that is necessary 
to finance the technologies in the demonstration and deployment stages to meet a 500–550ppm 
CO2-e stabilisation as presented in Figure 12. In this figure, the vast majority of early stage ven-
ture capital is the public investment needed to stimulate later stage private investments, suggest-
ing that a global public venture capital fund capitalised with USD 28.6–34.8 billion is required to 
help leverage subsequent venture capital and private equity investments to bring new technolo-
gies into deployment.  
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Figure 15 Increase in types of venture capital and private equity investments to investment 
in new technologies required for a 500–550ppm CO2-e stabilisation (billions of 
United States dollars per year). 
 
 
 
Author’s estimate based on IEA (2008a) and: NEF and UNEP-SEFI (2008). Note that the low scenario refers to the low 
end of the estimated range and the high scenario refers to the high end of the estimated range in figure 12.  
6.3.3 Increasing the flow, scale and quality of proposals 
According to the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC, 2006; 2009; 2010) 
and Vivid Economics (2009), investment by large institutional investors is hampered by a lack of 
high quality propositions from fund managers and other parties and a lack of an overall policy 
framework that can underpin investment in low emission technologies.  
 
There is also a lack of information about the potential for investment and the potential returns in-
volved. NEF database using 2007 data shows the gap between funds available and actual invest-
ment (Figure 16). Ideally the reverse should be the case with the availability of investment oppor-
tunities exceeding funds available and hence driving investors to find new financing for climate 
change mitigation technologies.  
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Figure 16  Gap between supply of funds for venture capital (funds raised) and private equity 
investments and actual investment illustrating the need to enhance the flow of vi-
able projects to venture capital firms and institutional investors (millions of 
United States dollars per year). 
 
 
NEF database (2007 data); Abbreviations: VCPE = Venture Capital and Private Equity 
 
The World Resources Institute (WRI, 2008) propose the establishment of an International Project 
Development Facility, which could undertake market analysis, programme and large-scale project 
feasibility and early scoping and development work, and could help structure suitable financial 
packages drawing upon available (and new) public financing mechanisms to reveal to the market 
the potential for investment on commercially attractive terms.  
 
In 2009, Australia recognised the need to address the gap between funds available and bankable 
projects in its proposal for a Leveraging Service within the negotiations under the Convention. In 
its submission of 9 June 2009 (Government of Australia, 2009) to the second reading speech of 
the AWG-LCA Chair’s negotiating text, it inserted the following text, which was supported by 
other Annex I Parties:  
 
A new technology leveraging service which could form part of a broader facilitation platform 
should be created to provide an interactive facilitation service for actions identified through 
low emission development strategies and/or TNA/NAMA/NAPA processes. This service is to 
be provided to developing countries and would, on a voluntary basis, assess potential actions, 
assist in the development of rigorous projects proposals and assist in matching with the most 
appropriate form of investment support, particularly with a view to leveraging private sector 
funding. This service would work closely with relevant international financing institutions, 
multilateral development banks and the private sector. 
 
This proposal was later incorporated into the proposed Technology Mechanism that was close to 
agreement in Copenhagen and was featured in paragraph 11 of the Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2009d).  
 
Hamilton (2009) argues that support arrangements, similar to those that have been used to create 
bankable projects in developing countries, need to be applied to create ‘investment grade’ poli-
Page 44 of 94 
cies, particularly as Parties move to implement the system of nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions and large-scale national adaptation plans envisaged in the negotiating text. 
6.3.4 Global financial architecture: Role of the financial mechanism of the 
Convention 
In response to the growing concerns about climate change there has been a proliferation of finan-
cial schemes established to support investment in climate change technologies, particularly since 
200523. Most of these new sources of finance have been established outside of the Convention. 
Figure 17 illustrates the institutional ‘landscape’ of climate change financing mechanisms both 
inside and outside of the UNFCCC. Within this general structure there are many other financing 
instruments. For example, there are hundreds of public financing mechanisms at national and sub-
national-scales and dozens of financing instruments that have been implemented by regional de-
velopment banks (UNEP, 2008a; UNFCCC, 2008a).  
 
Figure 17  Global institutional landscape for financing climate change technologies 
 
 
Source: Author’s diagram based on UNFCCC (2008a; 2009a). 
 
The institutions in which public financing mechanisms are located can have an important bearing 
on the leveraging effects that are achieved by those mechanisms. This is often because the institu-
tions have different financing instruments at their disposal or because the mandate with which 
they operate differs. For example, the Bretton Woods Institutions (International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank Group) have a wide range of financial tools at their disposal, many of which 
have been designed to leverage private sector investment. On the other hand, funds established 
under the Convention are often only mandated to provide grant-based financing, which may not 
be designed to mobilise private sector investment in achieving the desired mitigation or adapta-
tion outcomes.  
                                                 
23 See for example http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing, last accessed 04/2010. 
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The proliferation of financing mechanisms outside of the Convention could be interpreted as an 
encouraging sign in that it creates competition between institutions which may stimulate innova-
tion as each entity finds a suitable role within the financing landscape. However, such prolifera-
tion can result in duplication and lack of overall efficiency. It is also a sign that there is a lack of 
leadership on the issue of financing as each institution is vying for power to take the commanding 
role. The Convention is the pre-eminent expression of global efforts to address climate change 
and surely it should embody sufficient financial and political power to provide the leadership and 
direction for financing, maximise efficiency and shape the financing landscape so that it delivers 
in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Convention (Müller and Winkler, 2009).  
 
However, the GEF as the only source of finance for mitigation directly under the authority of the 
Convention is one of the smallest sources of finance within the existing financial landscape.  
 
Strengthening the role of the Convention in the institutional architecture for financing climate 
change technologies may not necessarily mean that all mechanisms for delivering finance for 
emissions reduction projects would reside within the Convention. If this were the case it would 
essential require the creation of a new financing institution under the Convention with similar ca-
pability as the Bretton Woods institutions (UNFCCC, 2009a;b). It should be possible to harness 
the existing institutions to deliver the objectives of the Convention. However, to do so requires a 
financing mechanism under the Convention that has both the authority and the means to do so. In 
terms of the means, adequate financial leverage under the Convention is critical. It would be nec-
essary for the Convention to possess sufficient financial resources to leverage shifts in global fi-
nancial institutions on the scale necessary.  
 
The financial mechanism of the Convention could function as a large fund of funds. Under the 
guidance of the COP, the mechanism would define the desired global strategic outcomes, the ac-
tivities to be supported and how to hold to account the recipient financial institutions, and make 
the allocation of funds conditional upon reforms in these institutions24
                                                 
24 For example, funds allocated to the World Bank could be made conditional that the Bank moves to phase out financ-
ing for high emission technologies.  
 that further contribute to-
ward the financing of climate change technologies.  
 
China has proposed a new financial architecture under the Convention, which is presented in Fig-
ure 18. The proposed finance Board would have take the strategic role in the coordination of fi-
nancing instruments and institutions towards the overall efficient delivery of financing for climate 
change.  
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Figure 18 Chinese proposal for a new financial architecture within the United National 
Framework Convention on Climate Change  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2008c). 
 
As Müller (2010) argues, the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009d) when read in conjunction 
with the AWG-LCA text on the institutional arrangements for finance (UNFCCC, 2009f) can be 
interpreted to conclude that the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund will be established as an operat-
ing entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention. The Fund would be governed by a Fi-
nance Board under the Convention, and it would oversee the distribution of funds through various 
financial windows, potentially existing funds under the Convention or outside of the Convention.  
 
When read in its proper context from the perspective of the AWG-LCA texts and negotiations, 
the Copenhagen Accord not only resolves the question of the quantity of finance (albeit without 
clarity of the public and private shares) but it also clarifies that a Convention Fund governed by a 
new institution of the Convention under the guidance of the COP will be established, and given 
its size and potential institutional power, it may go some way to restoring the role of the Conven-
tion’s financial mechanism in steering the overall financial architecture for climate change. 
6.3.5 Key gaps by stage of technological maturity 
6.3.5.1 Research and development: lack of support for developing countries 
The UNFCCC report on financing options for technology development and transfer (2009b) con-
cluded that “[a]lthough R&D is becoming more international, there is no international funding 
mechanism and there is limited coordination for such activities”.  
 
Grubb (2005) recommends an internationally coordinated approach to R&D in the energy sector 
and in particular a Global Research and Development Fund to support technologies whose high 
development cost cannot readily be borne by public funds in a single country. 
 
Many other authors have recommended substantial increases in publicly funded R&D. For exam-
ple, Stern et al., (2006) recommend a doubling of government R&D funding to drive down tech-
nology costs and to support new breakthrough technologies that can substantially reduce green-
house gas emissions across the economy. 
 
At COP 14 in Poznan, an in-session workshop was held on “cooperation on research and devel-
opment of current, new and innovative technology, including win-win solutions”. At that work-
Page 47 of 94 
shop the Chair of the EGTT stated that possible options for cooperation being explored by the 
EGTT include global pooling of R&D funds, coordinating existing R&D programmes, and in-
creasing public investment and incentives for greater private investment in R&D. The workshop 
emphasized that “the accelerated development of key technologies could reduce the cost of stabi-
lizing the concentration of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere by hundreds of 
billions of dollars globally.” (UNFCCC, 2008e) 
 
Cooperative approaches identified in the workshop included joint programmes, technology cen-
tres, demonstration projects and research infrastructure investments. The importance of building 
endogenous R&D capacity in developing countries and the current gaps in financing for R&D in 
developing countries was identified as a significant issue of concern.  
 
Cooperative R&D is one of outstanding issues within the technology development and transfer 
negotiations under the AWG-LCA, with the text currently heavily bracketed (UNFCCC, 2009e) 
and with the USA prosecuting a position that would prevent funds from the Convention going to 
R&D in developing countries.  
 
6.3.5.2 The demonstration stage and the ‘valley of death’ 
At the demonstration stage developers experience a phenomenon known as the ‘valley of death’ 
where there is a gap in both public and private sources of finance (Figure 19). This metaphor is 
extensively used by researchers and policy makers to describe the gap in available financing for 
companies and technologies that are in their early development stages, where R&D funding be-
comes less available but the risks are still too great for private investors to contemplate, or the 
sum of money needed is minimal and not within the funding windows of larger funding mecha-
nisms (US SBA, 1994; Branscomb and Auerswald, 2002; Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003; 
Murphy and Edwards, 2003; Wessner, 2005; Williams, 2004; Auerswald, et al., 2005).  
 
Figure 19 Valley of Death showing the typical financing sources and stages of technology 
development 
 
 
Source: Murphy and Edwards (2003). Abbreviations: Biz = business. 
 
Grubb (2005) recommends a specific global fund to support technology demonstrations. Many 
Parties to the Convention (EU, Japan, Australia, US, China) have also proposed international 
measures targeting the demonstration of technologies in developing countries (UNFCCC, 2008b). 
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Japan supports global technology road maps that would be supported by national programmes to 
demonstrate technologies at scale. Japan has established a USD 10 billion ‘Cool Earth’ initiative 
to demonstrate a wide range of new technologies in developing countries (METI, 2008). The EU 
proposes a series of ‘technology orientated agreements’ with a focus on technologies with large 
mitigation potential currently in the demonstration stage (UNFCCC, 2008b).  
6.3.5.3 Deployment of technologies in developing countries 
The International Energy Agency and the UNFCCC have estimated that an additional 10 to 120 
billion per annum in early deployment support for technologies in developing countries will be 
necessary as part of an overall financing strategy to meet a 500–550 ppm CO2-e stabilisation 
(IEA, 2008b; UNFCCC, 2009b).  
 
Under the Convention these are additional or incremental costs that are to be financed by devel-
oped countries (Annex II Parties). However, the types of mechanisms that can most efficiently 
drive the early deployment of technologies are national market-based mechanisms which subsi-
dise these more expensive technologies and make then attractive relative to the cost of incumbent 
technologies that are more emissions intensive. Project-based approaches such as the CDM have 
not been designed to support early stage technologies, and project-based mechanisms such as the 
GEF would need to be scaled up to such a extent as to be unwieldy. For these reasons, a policy-
based approach is more desirable.  
 
A policy-based approach would support developing countries to financing national policies such 
as renewable energy targets through policy instruments such as feed-in tariffs or renewable en-
ergy obligations for electricity generators. With technical assistance from developed countries, 
the national government would develop strategies for implementing national policies to drive 
early deployment of climate change technologies. A financial mechanism under the Convention 
would provide the appropriate financing package to support the implementation of the policy. 
This may involve a combination of financing instruments, including direct grants, concessional 
loans, carbon crediting and other forms of support. The financing may be made conditional upon 
other national policy reforms that if not addressed would affect the overall performance of the 
policy.  
 
Another option for early deployment of technology may be to allow for a portion of a developed 
country’s renewable energy obligations to be fulfilled from new renewable energy projects in de-
veloping countries. This would have the benefit of reducing the overall cost of renewable energy 
obligations in developed countries (IEA, 2005) and would provide additional source of financing 
for early deployment of technologies in developing countries.  
6.3.5.4 Technology diffusion: Energy efficiency technologies and measures 
In most economic modelling of investments in climate change technologies, energy efficiency 
takes a dominant share of emissions reductions. For example the World Energy Outlook (IEA, 
2008a) estimates that close to half of the emissions reductions to meet a 500–550ppm CO2-e sta-
bilisation scenario is met by energy efficiency, especially in the transport and buildings sectors. 
Such investments in energy efficiency are projected by the IEA to result in cumulative fuel sav-
ings of USD 7 trillion by 2030 (IEA, 2008a).  
 
Despite the importance of energy efficiency, there are very few mechanisms that actively support 
energy efficiency technologies. Analysis in UNFCCC (2008a) concludes that the transport sector 
and commercial and residential buildings sectors are the least well covered sectors, and that the 
CDM has been spectacularly ineffective in supporting energy efficiency.  
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WRI (2008) recommends a large-scale concessional loan-based instrument to support energy ef-
ficiency investments in developing countries. The IFC has successfully demonstrated this ap-
proach in China and Russia. The IFC investment in China involved issuing USD 126 million in 
loans which resulted in USD 1.78 billion in private sector investment into energy efficiency 
measures (leveraging 1:10). Because energy efficiency measures result in lower costs due to fuel 
savings they are suited to loan-based instruments where large-scale efficiency reforms can fi-
nance the repayment of loans.  
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7 Leveraging ratios of existing and proposed measures to  
finance climate change mitigation technologies  
This chapter reviews the levering ratios of a wide range of policies by stage of technological ma-
turity, in order to arrive at an average range of the leveraging effects of policies that are in prac-
tice or are proposed within the negotiation process under the Convention.  
 
Existing public incremental financing for climate change mitigation technologies is estimated at 
about USD 55.5–82.0 billion per annum with approximately 4–5 dollars of private finance lever-
aged on average for every 1 dollar invested by governments through the various financial sources 
and vehicles both inside and outside the Convention (UNFCCC, 2009b). As shown in Chapter 6, 
this is substantially less than the total level of investment that is required.  
 
Unless leveraging ratios are improved, the required level of public finance to address climate 
change mitigation will be at least 67.4–213.6 billion per annum. Importantly, leverage ratios tend 
to increase as technologies become more mature (see Figure 20), but to meet climate change tar-
gets less mature technologies which are higher risk investments, with lower private sector lever-
aging potential, must be deployed early. This suggests that the public sector contributions must be 
higher or the public policy measures in the earlier stages of technology deployment need to be 
much more effective in leveraging the private sector.  
 
Figure 20 Stylistic representation of the proportions of public and private financing neces-
sary at each stage of technological maturity. 
 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2009b). 
 
Available evidence shows that existing funds under the Convention are relatively weak in their 
ability to leverage private sector investment. For example, the financial mechanism of the Con-
vention currently achieves relatively low levels of private sector leveraging. In 2004, a review of 
a sample of GEF projects (GEF, 2004b) revealed that about 10 per cent of GEF projects involved 
meaningful engagement with the private sector. It was estimated that for every USD 1 of public 
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money invested from specialised funds, USD 0.67 of private money was leveraged25
The CDM has been a more effective tool for leveraging private investment, with leverage ratios 
in the order of 1:6–10 (derived from Haites, 2007; OECD, 2009b). But even if the CDM was 
scaled up as has been proposed by many Parties to the UNFCCC, the financing gap would remain 
large. The UNFCCC estimates that an expanded CDM and other crediting measures could pro-
vide an additional 10–34 billion per annum by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2008c).
. In GEF’s 
2001 annual report it confirmed that for USD 4.2 billion it was able to leverage USD 2.3 billion 
of private investment averaged over the period 1991–2001 for all of its programme areas (GEF, 
2001). However, more recent data suggests a significant improvement in GEF leveraging, per-
haps reflecting a concerted effort by the GEF to address this issue in recent years. From Septem-
ber 2008 to June 2009 mitigation projects with a total allocation of USD 233 million from the 
GEF Trust Fund will leverage just over USD 500 million in private finance (a ratio of about 1:2) 
(personal communication D. Zevgolis, GEF programme officer, 10 April, 2010). Currently the 
GEF invests just USD 0.22 billion per annum in technology development and transfer for climate 
change (UNFCCC, 2009b).  
 
26
UNEP (2008a) reviewed 43 relatively new and innovative public financial mechanisms (PFM) 
operating at the national and sub-national-scale. Their analysis included an assessment of the lev-
eraging effects of these instruments and concluding that “an assessment of experience with a 
number of different models of PFMs shows that typical leverage ratios range from 3 to 15:1”.
 
 
Outside of the Convention, the World Bank claims a leverage ratio of 1:6 and the IFC claims to 
achieve the greatest levels of private sector leveraging of 1:5–11 (GEF, 2004b; World Bank, 
2007). Reviews of these programmes suggest that these organizations are more successful in lev-
eraging private sector investment because as banks they possess the financial instruments that are 
attractive to the private sector, they manage risks within the boundaries that private sector inves-
tors are willing to accept and they have decision making systems that are more consistent with 
decision making in the private sector (GEF, 2004b).  
 
27
                                                 
25 Often public funding from other sources was leveraged. GEF public sector leveraging is estimated at 1:4–6 
26 In 2007, USD 46 billion was invested through the CDM. Therefore total CDM investment would be USD 56–80 bil-
lion per year (UNFCCC, 2008c).  
27 That is to say that for every one dollar of public money invested 3–15 are leveraged from the private sector.  
 
The public financial mechanisms reviewed by UNEP (2008a) are presented along with existing 
commercial financing mechanisms according to the stage of technological maturity that they ad-
dress in Figure 21. Gaps in financing, which were discussed in Chapter 6, are also identified in 
Figure 21. 
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Figure 21 Financing gaps, public financing mechanisms and commercial financing mecha-
nisms for climate change mitigation technologies 
 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2009b) adapted from NEF and UNEP-SEFI (2008); and Carmody and Ritchie (2007)  
Abbreviations: NAMAs = nationally appropriate mitigation actions, R&D = research and development, VC = venture 
capital.  
 
Differences in leveraging ratios also reflect the stage of technological maturity that each pro-
gramme addresses. The GEF is often working in the deployment stage, where private sector risk 
is higher; whereas the World Bank and IFC are focused on technologies in the diffusion stage. 
Similarly the majority of CDM projects are also focused on the later stages of technological ma-
turity, where private finance is more available (UNFCCC, 2008a; 2009a; b).  
 
Sections 7.1–7.4 below review the leveraging ratios of various public policies and investment 
programmes that have been used within each stage of the technology cycle. Information on the 
effectiveness of policies and investment programmes in other sectors is also used where this in-
formation provides useful insights for the potential leveraging ratios of equivalent policies and 
investment programmes for climate change mitigation technologies. 
7.1 Research and Development 
Public policies and sources of finance that support R&D investments are predominantly focused 
at the national-scale, with international measures characterised by coordination and information 
sharing efforts, such as the IEA Implementing Agreements28, the International Partnership for the 
Hydrogen Economy29 and the Methane to Markets30
                                                 
28 See http://www.iea.org/techno/index.asp, last accessed 04/2010. 
29 See http://www.iphe.net/, last accessed 04/2010. 
30 See http://www.methanetomarkets.org/, last accessed 04/2010. 
 initiative.  
 
At the national level, financing for public R&D tends to involve competitive grant-based pro-
grammes aimed at public institutions such as universities, which are structured to deliver on stra-
tegic priorities determined by the respective national governments. In some cases these public 
programmes are disconnected from private R&D efforts occurring on often similar technologies 
in corporations. However, the public sector also usually provides direct grant-based support to 
private R&D activities.  
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Another approach to mobilising private sector investment is through joint/collaborative research 
centres and programmes where industry and public partnerships combine resources and research 
activities are blended toward achieving shared research outcomes. Intellectual property agree-
ments within these public/private partnerships are used to share the benefits of research outcomes. 
These joint approaches have proved relatively successful where public research objectives are 
aligned with clear and immediate private benefits and tend to occur in areas of applied research 
rather than basic research areas. In situations where research is focused on public good outcomes 
the opportunities for partnerships diminish and the potential for private sector leveraging from 
public R&D expenditure is significantly reduced.  
 
According to Australia’s recent review of its Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) programme, 
total public investment of AUD 9.7 billion leveraged AUD 2.3 billion of private sector invest-
ment (a leverage ratio of 1:0.24). Despite the relatively low levels of private sector research that 
the CRC programme leverages, the intensity of leveraging requirements are considered a major 
barrier to public good research and has resulted in gaming of research programmes and signifi-
cant substitution of resources from different governments (state and federal) and government 
agencies (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). Similarly, Feldman and Kelley (2001) have re-
viewed the effectiveness of the US Advanced Technology Program (a public-private partnership 
programme) in leveraging private sector R&D through a survey of participants, however, leverag-
ing ratios for the programme were not established (Feldman and Kelley, 2001). 
 
According to the European Commission Research Division every Euro invested by the Commis-
sion in public R&D leverages an additional Euro in private investment (EU Directorate General 
Research, 2007). However, the extent to which private sector investment in R&D is leveraged in 
climate change technologies is less well known.  
 
A commonly used mechanism for stimulating private sector R&D is the provision of taxation in-
centives which involve foregoing public taxation revenue rather than the direct use of public 
funds to stimulate investment. There are many types of tax incentives offered by governments, 
including exemptions such as real estate tax abatements, deductions, credits, preferential calcula-
tions, or reduced rates that can lower the company’s total tax burden (IEA World Energy Outlook 
Policy Database31
Analysis of private R&D performance in the United States and Japan highlights the importance of 
effective connections between academic research undertaken in universities with private firms 
(Branstetter and Hyeog Ug, 2004). These connections tend to maximise the spill over effects of 
public research and in return increase the quality and quantity of effective private R&D activities. 
Both the quality of advanced education and research and the relationships between academia and 
, Kline and Benioff, 2008). This type of instrument stimulates whole of econ-
omy investment in R&D to provide a broad base of investment. It can only be used by established 
firms that have income streams (and therefore taxation debts) that can be offset with taxation 
credits. It is difficult to estimate the leveraging effect of tax incentives, because companies may 
have intended to undertake the research without the tax incentive. However if it is assumed that 
the majority result in new R&D activities and if it is assumed that tax incentives have 100 per 
cent tax deductibility, then the value of the tax deductions should equate to the value of the re-
search undertaken resulting in a 1 to 1 leveraging ratio. In the US Federal R&D tax credit claims 
reached an estimated USD 5.5 billion in 2003, in additional to the tax credits programmes offered 
by 32 US States (National Science Board, 2008). 
 
                                                 
31 Available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/pm/?mode=weo, last accessed 04/2010. 
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private firms are important to maximise leverage on private sector research activity and knowl-
edge building. However, it has not been possible to quantify the effect.  
 
In the context of the Convention, China has proposed that additional resources for R&D could be 
made available either through a defined new revenue stream or through defined contributions 
from developed countries (UNFCCC, 2008c). This new funding would be pooled into a climate 
change R&D fund and used to leverage additional new R&D investment by both the public and 
private sector. While estimates of the leveraging potential of this proposal have not been made, it 
may be possible to draw upon previous experience with this type of approach as used in the agri-
cultural sector with the creation of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) in 1971.  
 
An extensive review of CGIAR by the World Bank (Lele, 2004) concluded that CGIAR has been 
very effective, and that for every one dollar invested, 9 dollars in additional food production 
within the developing world has resulted. However, the same review found pressure to increase 
leveraging of finance within CGIAR resulted in diminished public good research outcomes and 
“a drift in the research programme [which] undermined the traditional excellence of CGIAR sci-
ence” (Lele, 2004, pg. 94). Nonetheless, based on the CGAIR experience it may be possible to 
expect leveraging from a global R&D fund in the order of 1:5–10 (see also Raitzer, 2003). While 
this approach would boost R&D efforts in global priority technology areas, addressing the need 
for R&D in developing countries will require additional support measures.  
 
Responding to the gap in R&D in developing countries, India (UNFCCC, 2008f) has proposed 
the establishment of a network of climate technology development and diffusion centres aimed at 
addressing the diverse range of technology, business and regulatory barriers to the development 
and diffusion of a specific technology, involving technology developers, companies, regulators 
and policy makers. The activities of this network would include product development, develop-
ment of appropriate business models and policy and market research/analysis to support regulato-
ry and policy development.  
 
In July 2008 the Carbon Trust (Carbon Trust, 2008) published a detailed proposal which reflects 
the Indian proposition and has been designed so that it can be scaled up. Table 7 presents the 
main components of the Carbon Trust proposal, including the potential leveraging effects that 
could be achieved, based on the experience of the Carbon Trust. Their full-scale proposal is used 
for the estimates in Table 7. 
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Table 7 Leveraging Potential of the Carbon Trust Proposal for a network of innovation centres (author’s estimates based on Carbon 
Trust, 2008) 
Activity type Estimated 
required 
funding per 
project 
(USD) 
Type of sup-
port/funding me-
chanism 
Typical 
length of 
project 
Estimated 
number of 
projects  
initiated per 
Centre per 
year  
Indicative  
required fund-
ing per year 
(USD million) 
Leverage ratio Resultant  
private  
investment 
(USD million) 
Applied research 
and development 
0.1–1 million Grant(co-funding) 2–5 years 10–20 10 Direct industry co-funding  
(1:1 leverage potential) 
10 
Technology acce-
lerators 
2–10 million Grant(co-funding) 2–5 years 1–5 40  Direct industry co-funding  
(1:2 leverage potential) 
Catalyzed market, leading to  
significant commercial investment 
(1:10 leverage potential). 
80 
 
400 
Business incuba-
tor services 
50–100  
thousand 
Grant, advisory 
services and/or 
investment 
6–12 months 5–25 2.5 Subsequent fundraising by  
supported companies as a result of  
incubation services (1:10 leverage 
potential). 
25 
Enterprise crea-
tion 
10 million Investment 3–7 years 1–2 10 Direct industry co-investment (1:5 
leverage potential). 
50 
Early stage fund-
ing for low car-
bon ventures 
3 million (for 
first round 
funding only) 
Investment or loan 3–7 years 2–10 30 Co-investment by private sector 
funds (1:10 leverage potential). 
Further catalyzed market for low 
carbon investment through  
demonstrated success. 
300 
Energy efficiency 
measures 
10–100  
thousand 
Advisory services 
and/or loans 
12–24 
months, re-
peatable 
100–1,000pa 50 Stimulate investment by organisation 
receiving support (1:5). 
250 
Skills/capacity 
building 
50 thousand 
–1 million 
Grant and/or advi-
sory servic-
es/training 
6–24 months 2–5 5 Leverage of partner company re-
sources. 
Catalyzed markets by freeing supply 
chain capacity constraints  
(leveraging potential unknown). 
unknown 
National policy 
and market in-
sights 
100–500 
thousand 
In-house and 
commissioned 
strategy work 
3–12 months 2–5 2.5 Catalyzed markets by enabling de-
velopment of regulatory regimes 
which incentivise and de-risk low 
carbon private sector investment 
(leveraging potential unknown). 
unknown 
Total     150  1115 
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International prizes for R&D breakthroughs or advanced purchasing commitments by developed 
countries are two similar mechanisms that have been proposed (Newell and Wilson, 2005; World 
Bank, 2008a).  
 
They are similar in that they provide a future financial incentive to motivate innovators to de-
velop solutions to climate change. Advanced purchasing commitments have been applied in the 
health sector for the development of vaccines. The idea is that a government or philanthropic or-
ganisation agrees to subsidise the purchase of a technology which currently does not exist. In the 
case of the health sector, the technology in question was a vaccine for pneumococcal disease32
 
 
(see Kremer, et al., 2005).  
 
There is some debate on the effect that advanced purchasing commitments generate in terms of 
R&D investment (World Bank, 2008b). In the context of the health sector, and on the more pes-
simistic side of the range, Finkelstein (2004) estimates that every 1 dollar incentive for advanced 
purchasing leverages six cents of additional R&D expenditure, with much greater leveraging oc-
curring in the commercialization of drug therapies. It is thought that while advanced purchasing 
commitments do have a pull effect on investment, it is in the later stages of technology develop-
ment rather than in the early R&D stages where the stimulus is greatest.  
 
Another important limitation with advanced purchasing commitments is that they require very 
clear contractual arrangements on the purchasing, and this requires a wide range of potential legal 
and other issues to be predicted without knowledge of what specific issues may emerge. 
 
Prizes may be more suited to climate change technologies and they avoid this later issue of prede-
fining the purchase commitment. They may also be more suited to stimulating research, as the 
awarding of an international prize is something more familiar than an advanced purchasing com-
mitment and more relevant to the work of researchers. Research by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) 
shows how prize-based mechanisms tend to induce less risk averse behaviour and foster more 
radical innovations than other motivational factors. Evidence would suggest that research activity 
stimulated from a prize would be more than the level at which the prize was set, but it is not poss-
ible to estimate the leverage that could result. For the purposes of this dissertation it is assumed 
that leveraging in the order of 1:1–2 would be achieved.  
 
Table 8 summarises the types of measures that being employed or proposed to leverage invest-
ment from the private sector into R&D. The figure provides information the potential to scale up, 
and the applicability of each approach to different private sector entities and to enhancing financ-
ing in developing countries.  
                                                 
32 http://www.gavialliance.org/media_centre/press_releases/2010_03_23_amc_commitment.php, last accessed 04/2010. 
Page 57 of 94 
Table 8  Summary of existing and proposed policy approaches to leveraging private sector investment in R&D (author’s estimates based 
on literature referenced in section 7.1) 
 
Policy approach Typical  
leveraging 
ratios 
Research 
Stage 
Potential 
to Scale 
up 
Benefits  Disbenefits Applicability 
to Develop-
ing Coun-
tries 
Grants - Direct 1:0–0.5 Basic  
research; 
proof of con-
cept 
Large Can be effective in supporting 
start up firms and researchers 
that cannot attract private  
investment due to risk profiles 
Unless carefully design grant  
programmes do not tend to encourage 
collaboration between institutions and 
the private sector 
Yes 
Leveraged Grants 1:3–4 Applied  
research, 
deployment  
Moderate Achieves greater leverage 
than direct grants 
May be difficult to secure private sector 
involvement in some technology areas; 
may skew research away from public 
good to private research objectives 
Limited 
Joint Public/Private 
Research Centres 
1:0.2–1 Applied  
research 
Moderate Provides a model for shared 
intellectual property 
May skew research away from public 
good to private research objectives 
Yes 
Network of  
Innovation Centres 
1:7–8 All Stages Large Integrated approach allows for 
synergies to be harnessed 
across different mechanisms. 
Builds endogenous capacity 
and local technology  
adaptations 
As a regional and integrated approach 
would require care to build upon  
existing activity within each region  
Yes 
Incubators 1:1–20 Development Moderate Increases business capability 
and accelerates technology 
development and learning 
As this is a business by business  
approach it may be difficult to scaled-
up significantly 
Yes 
Tax incentives 1:1 Applied  
research 
Large Support large firms that have 
existing income streams 
Small start up firms do not have  
revenue streams and can’t take  
advantage of tax benefits 
Limited 
Advanced  
Purchasing  
Commitments 
1:1–2 Applied  
research;  
Development 
Limited Particularly well suited to 
technologies will disparate yet 
active private sector research 
Difficult to predict advanced purchasing 
contracts 
Limited 
Inducement Prizes 1:1–2 Applied  
research 
Limited Suited to stimulating more 
radical innovations 
Tends to have a narrow focus on a  
single breakthrough technology 
Limited 
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7.2 Demonstration 
During the demonstration (and deployment) stage of a technology’s development, the main policy 
challenge is to create an effective relationship between the public and private sector and to ensure 
that socially vital technologies and emissions reduction activities are available in time and fit for 
purpose.  
 
In recent years, the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), the US Department of 
Energy and many other agencies that support technology development in the US have taken more 
strategic and direct involvement in technology support in the demonstration phase (NREL, 2006).  
 
Technology incubation involves an intensive approach to supporting early stage technology de-
velopers to leveraging private sector investment (infoDev, 2009). Incubators help in the commer-
cialization of technologies and coach technology developers in understanding the requirements of 
financiers and create bankable business plans. The services provided by the incubators include 
physical infrastructure, training, marketing, technical support, access to financing, legal support 
and networking. 
 
According to the US Department of Energy its investment in 2002 of USD 2.5 million in technol-
ogy incubators resulting in USD 173 million in private capital raised; a leveraging ratio of 1:69 
(Figure 22). The success of this programme demonstrates the potential effectiveness of incubator 
programmes, which are being extensively adopted by national governments throughout the world.  
 
Figure 22  NREL Energy Technology Incubator Programme Performance, 2002–2006 
 
 
Source: NREL (2006). 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Carbon Trust established an incubator programme for low emissions 
technologies in 2004. As of the 2008, the Trust had invested GBP 3.8 million in 70 low carbon 
start up businesses, which has resulted in GBP 65 million in private sector investment (leveraging 
1:17) (UNEP-SEFI, 2008). 
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For technology-based start-up firms equity financing is essential. Because of the high perceived 
risk of investing in a start-up firm they have fewer options for obtaining finance. Here technology 
incubators play a significant role. The incubators help firms to prepare their business plans, a ma-
jor ingredient in getting finance. Firms also get help from the incubators with legal assistance for 
drafting license agreements and intellectual property protection. 
 
The majority of technology incubators are affiliated with some kind of public or private research 
institution, such as a university, technology park and organizations with R&D capabilities. Often 
government support is key to the success of such incubators.  
 
Figure 23 presents the number of incubators in various energy technologies globally, excluding 
China, in 2007. Some incubators support more than one technology. 
 
Figure 23  Clean Energy Incubators by Sector, 2007 
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Source: UNEP and NEF (2008); Abbreviations: Eff = Efficiency. 
 
Technology incubation programmes are most common in the United States and Europe as shown 
in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24 Clean Energy Incubators by Country, 2007 
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Source: UNEP and NEF (2008). The vertical access indicates the number of incubators identified by country. 
 
In the US, the Small Business Innovative Research Program provided approximately USD 1.8 
billion in 2007 in grants to American small businesses for early-stage R&D projects. Approx-
imately 50 per cent of small businesses receiving grants through the programme have reached the 
fully commercial stage, 23 per cent remained under development, 16 per cent were in the com-
mercialization phase and the remainder had failed (Humanitis, 2007). According to Charles 
Wessner, who has recently conducted an extensive evaluation of the programme (Wessner, 2008), 
its success has lead to its adoption in many other countries including Finland, Sweden, Russia, 
Netherlands, India, Japan, Korea and Taiwan33
Other programmes attempt to facilitate investment by matching investors with technology devel-
opers who are in the very early stages of technology development. In Australia, the COMET pro-
gramme has been able to assist the firms it supports to get third party funds from groups such as 
.  
 
The evaluation of SBIR in the health sector sub-programme examined the private leverage gener-
ated from the public investments since 1992 (Wessner, 2008). The study found that for the origi-
nal USD 551 million invested over the period (until 2001), approximately 50 per cent of busi-
nesses had made it to market and cumulative sales revenue of businesses increased from  
USD 821 million in 2002 to USD 1.95 billion in 2007. Therefore the leverage ratio over 13 years 
is 1:3.5. 
 
Also in the US, the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) programme was created in 1958 
to help small businesses meet long-term capital not available through commercial banks. Small 
companies often require equity financing in the critical USD 250,000 to USD 5 million range, not 
usually obtainable from private venture capital firms. SBICs help to bridge this capital gap. In 
2000, there were approximately 404 SBICs with over USD 16 billion under management nation-
wide. In 2000, approximately USD 5.5 billion was invested in 3,060 small businesses and, for 
2001, nearly USD 6 billion in SBIC investments is expected to be made (National Research 
Council, 2000). 
 
                                                 
33 See http://www.unece.org/ceci/ppt_presentations/2008/fid/Charles%20Wessner.pdf, last accessed 04/2010. 
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business angels, thereby resulting in AUD 6 being invested for every AUD 1 expended on the 
programme by the Australian Government (Cutler & Company, 2008). 
 
The amended EU Emission Trading Directive foresees that Member States should use at least 50 
per cent of their auctioning revenues to finance the climate change actions domestically and in-
ternationally, including the environmentally safe capture and geological storage of CO2. In addi-
tion, up to 300 million allowances in the new entrants reserve of the revised EU Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (ETS) will be made available for the construction and operation of up to 12 commer-
cial demonstration projects for the environmentally safe capture and geological storage of CO2 
and innovative renewable energy technologies in the EU. At an assumed forward price of 25 eu-
ros per allowance, the set aside could generate EUR 7.5 billion in financing for demonstration 
technologies until 2020.  
 
UNEP recently reviewed 43 clean energy public finance mechanisms, compared and drew lessons 
from them, and considered if and how they could be scaled up at an international level (UNEP, 
2008a). These measures are categorised by stage of technological maturity and according to their 
leveraging ratios in Table 9. As this Table highlights, very few mechanisms are functioning at the 
demonstration stage.  
 
Table 9  Public Finance Mechanisms Classified by Stage of Technological Maturity, Lev-
eraging Potential and Scalability (low = 1:0.5–2; medium = 1:2–5; high = 1:5–
20) 
 
Public Finance Mechanism 
Type 
Stage of Technol-
ogy 
Levering Potential Scalability 
Credit line for Senior Debt Diffusion Low-Medium High 
Guarantee Diffusion Medium-High High 
Project loan facility Diffusion Low-Medium Medium 
Project Development Grants Diffusion Medium-High Medium 
Credit line for Subordinate 
Debt 
Deployment-Diffusion Medium-High High 
Grants for Technical Assis-
tance 
Deployment-Diffusion High Medium 
Soft Loan Programmes Deployment-Diffusion Low-Medium High 
Carbon Finance Deployment-Diffusion Medium-High Medium 
Loan Softening programmes Deployment-Diffusion Medium Medium 
Equity Fund Deployment Medium-High High 
Venture Capital Demonstration-
Deployment 
Medium-High High 
Inducement Prizes R&D-Demonstration Medium-High Low-Medium 
 
Source: UNEP (2008a) and personal communication E. Usher, Manager UNEP-SEFI, 1 December 2008. 
 
Table 10 summarises the types of measures that national governments are currently employing or 
may be considering to leverage investment from the private sector into companies with technolo-
gies that are in the demonstration stage. The table provides information on the potential to scale 
up, the applicability of each approach to different private sector entities and their applicability to 
enhancing financing in developing countries.  
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Table 10  Summary of existing and proposed policy approaches to leveraging private sector investment in demonstration technologies (au-
thor’s estimates based on literature referenced in section 7.2) 
Policy approach Typical  
leveraging 
ratios 
Potential to 
Scale up 
Benefits  Disbenefits Applicability to 
Developing 
Countries 
Grants 1:5–10 Low-Medium Provides flexibility, 
doesn’t need to be re-
paid 
May be difficult to access, 
particularly for developing 
country firms 
Yes 
Public Private Partnerships 1:1–2 Low-Medium Allows for risk sharing; 
Can be used to finance 
large and difficult long-
term projects (e.g. infra-
structure) 
Tends to favour large es-
tablished firms 
Yes 
Public Procurement 1:0.5–1 Low-Medium In total, public procure-
ment is large-scale and 
long-term and can pro-
vide significant market 
stimulus  
Tends to favour large es-
tablished firms; Often pro-
ject-scale; May not match 
with public procurement 
objectives of value for 
money 
Limited 
Early-stage Public Venture Capital 1:10–20 High Equity stake in business 
can lead to higher busi-
ness performance; ad-
dresses a clear financ-
ing gap 
Requires companies to re-
linquish control, may de-
mand high returns on in-
vestment 
Highly depend-
ent upon ena-
bling environ-
ment 
Inducement Prizes 1:10–20 Medium Can harness competi-
tive forces to drive inno-
vation; spill over benefits 
can be significant; com-
plementary to other fi-
nancing options 
Tends to focus on specific 
technologies and applica-
tions  
Yes 
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7.3 Deployment 
The IEA (2008a) estimates that up to USD 200 billion per annum is needed globally in early pub-
lic financing support for the early deployment of energy technologies, including up to 120 billion 
per annum in developing countries.  
 
The challenge for financing technology deployment in developing countries at this scale should 
not be underestimated. Developing countries do not have the capacity to finance the incremental 
costs of these more costly technologies, and will rely upon financial and technology transfers 
from developed countries to do so. However, most mechanisms for technology transfer currently 
support mature technologies rather than advanced technologies (UNFCCC, 2008a). The GEF has 
previously attempted small-scale efforts at early deployment of technologies in developing coun-
tries but with mixed success (GEF, 2004a).  
 
Existing financial mechanisms provide support at the project-scale and programmatic approaches 
which aggregate projects and scale up the flow of financing are just beginning to be used. Sec-
toral and policy-based approaches to financing which provide direct budgetary support for the na-
tional policies that are required to deploy advanced technologies at sufficient scale currently do 
not exist (UNFCCC, 2008c).  
 
Sectoral and policy-based approaches are discussed in section 7.4 below, as they are (like the 
CDM) more directly relevant for technologies in the diffusion stage. Importantly, these ap-
proaches will rely upon the accreditation of national policies and measures (Ward, et al., 2008). 
Many of the options for national policies that support the early deployment of technologies in de-
veloping countries have been implemented in developed countries and the experience in using 
these policies is discussed below. 
 
One of the most commonly used public policy tools for the support of technologies in the de-
ployment stage are subsidies, which cover the cost premium for these technologies. Subsidies for 
the deployment of climate change mitigation technologies are usually provided in the forms 
summarised in Table 11, below. 
 
Table 11  Types and examples of subsidies used to support technologies in the deployment 
stage. 
 
Subsidy Type Examples 
Direct production subsidies Green-vehicle production subsidies; GEF 
financing for Solar PV manufacture in de-
veloping countries 
Direct deployment subsidies GEF projects; bilateral and multilateral aid 
programmes 
Tax Incentives Import excise exceptions; investment tax 
credits (e.g. income tax deductibility for in-
vestment in reafforestation projects); Pro-
duction tax credits (e.g. tax deductibility for 
companies producing a quantity of a given 
technology); Accelerated depreciation al-
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Subsidy Type Examples 
lowances (specified capital can be depreci-
ated at a faster rate)34
Recycling tax revenue 
; Consumer tax cred-
its (e.g. consumption of a given technology 
can be deducted from personal income 
taxes) 
UK Climate Change Levy 
Feed-in tariffs  German and Spanish feed-in tariff for do-
mestic solar thermal power 
Portfolio standards for energy generation Mandatory Renewable Energy Targets and 
renewable obligations (Australia, EU) 
Certificate schemes for energy efficiency UK White Certificate Scheme 
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook Policy Database35
Figure 25 presents the effect of direct subsidies on solar photovoltaic (PV) power in Japan and 
wind power in Denmark in terms of the market value of installed capacity in the case of PV, and 
company revenue in the case of wind (Carbon Trust, 2007). While this is a different measure of 
the leverage effect of a public investment, it does indicate the benefit of broad-scale subsidy pro-
 
 
Direct production subsidies can be structured to leverage additional private sector investment if 
they are made contingent upon co-investment from private firms. For example, the AUD 1.3 bil-
lion Australia green car subsidy will be paid to the Australian car manufacturing industry over a 
10 year period as competitive grants that require at least AUD 3 private sector investment for 
every AUD 1 public subsidy (Minister for Innovation, 10 November 2008). The grants will be 
conditional upon meeting agreed low emission targets for vehicle performance. 
 
Alternatively, subsidies can be linked to regulatory changes that, when coupled, drive private sec-
tor investment. Emissions trading schemes have tended to function in this way because emissions 
permits have been allocated for free to some industries (which is a form of subsidy because the 
permits have a monetary value and can be sold) or direct compensation is paid to polluters (espe-
cially those that are emissions intensive and trade exposed) to cover the increased costs that result 
from the emissions trading scheme. It is not possible to determine the level of internal investment 
that has resulted from the EU ETS and therefore the leverage ratio that has been achieved. The 
extent to which the long market in the EU ETS in 2006 resulted from abatement by liable parties 
or over-allocation of permits is heavily debated and analysis is only beginning to emerge (Eller-
man and Buchner, 2008). Nonetheless, the leveraging ratio is likely to be less than other policies 
and measures because emissions trading schemes tend to stimulate low cost abatement options 
with low investment costs and relatively high proportions of public carbon financing.  
 
Subsidy programmes have also been commonly used to stimulate investments in energy efficien-
cy both by industry and households. Evaluations of energy efficiency incentive programmes have 
found that 40–85 per cent of programme recipients would have acted in the absence of the pro-
gramme (Farla and Blok, 1998). Care must be taken when designing subsidy programmes to max-
imize efficiency requiring more discriminating methods for distributing subsidies. In the case of 
energy efficiency, standards and regulations are a more preferable policy instrument because they 
are much more efficient in leveraging private investment, whereas subsidies tend to socialise the 
cost of investment while privatizing the benefits (Newell, 2008).  
 
                                                 
34 Accelerated depreciation allowances tend to specify the technologies that are covered in the scheme and are not re-
sponsive to new technology developments. They have proved to be difficult to scale up to address a wider range of 
technologies.  
35 Available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/pm/?mode=weo, last accessed 04/2010. 
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grammes in supporting technologies which are at a competitive disadvantage to conventional 
power generation.  
 
Figure 25 Effect of direct subsidies on solar photovoltaic (PV) power in Japan and wind 
power in Denmark  
 
 
Source: Carbon Trust (2007). 
 
A recent study by Navigant Consulting (2008) estimates that extending the federal investment tax 
credit for renewable energy for eight years (valued at USD 15.7 billion in forgone taxation reve-
nue36
1. Offsetting cuts of 0.3 per cent in employers’ National Insurance contributions;  
) would increase domestic investment in the solar industry by USD 232 billion by 2016, re-
sulting in energy new solar energy to power seven million homes and to create directly or indi-
rectly 440,000 jobs. The resulting leveraging ratio of the federal investment tax credits is 1:14 
over several years. 
 
Fiscal measures can be used to recycle taxation revenue and increase advanced technology dep-
loyment rates. The UK Climate Change Levy and companion Climate Change Agreements is one 
example. The Levy is a tax on the use of energy in industry, commerce and the public sector. The 
revenue raised is recycled to business through three streams:  
2. Additional support for energy efficiency (technical support plus a 100 per cent first year 
capital allowance for certain energy saving investments, which is expected to be worth up 
to GBP 70 million a year); and  
3. Programmes to stimulate the uptake of renewable sources of energy (GBP 50 million a 
year).  
 
The objective has been no net gain for the public finances and no increase in the tax burden on 
industry as a whole (although it may not be cost-neutral at the individual firm level). 
                                                 
36 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billreport.xpd?bill=h110-6049&type=cbo, last accessed 04/2010. 
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Under the companion Climate Change Agreements, energy-intensive industries receive a rebate 
of up to 80 per cent of the Levy if they agree to a programme of energy savings, negotiated sector 
by sector. A review by Wordsworth and Grubb (2003) was unable to determine the level of pri-
vate sector investment that resulted from this measure, however, they conclude that the measure 
is cost-effective and would result in substantial private sector investment.  
 
Pricing policies such as feed-in tariffs allow for ease of entry into the marketplace, particularly 
for smaller companies and investments that wish to target the incremental costs of alternative 
energy sources, making them particularly suited to developing countries, where power markets 
are often small and dispersed (Sawin, 2004). Data on the leveraging ratios of feed-in tariffs has 
not been located in the course of researching this dissertation. If carefully targeted and designed 
to pay the marginal cost of abatement it would be reasonable to assume that feed-in tariffs leve-
rage private investment at a similar scale as other initiatives such as the CDM which pays inves-
tors the marginal cost of abatement. Therefore for the purpose of this study it is assumed that 
feed-in tariffs leverage in the order of 1:6–10.  
 
On the other hand, quota-based systems such as the Australian renewable energy target, which 
regulate for a certain quantity of abatement or installed capacity tend to be higher in cost and le-
verage less private investment, although the cost is passed on to the consumer directly rather than 
being paid with state taxation revenues. They may also cap the level of investment in climate 
change technologies if they are set lower than the market is willing to provide given consumer 
demand for such products. Again data on the average leveraging effect of quota-based systems 
could not be obtained, however, for the same reasons as feed-in tariffs, it is assumed that they le-
verage in the order of 1:6–10.  
 
Public procurement can also be used for the deployment of climate change mitigation technolo-
gies. A common example is in vehicle technologies, where some governments set aside a portion 
of the government vehicle fleet for low emission vehicles. In addition, governments may set 
longer term targets for the purchase of advanced vehicles that are currently unavailable in the 
domestic market. Because governments have large purchasing power, vehicle manufacturers have 
an incentive to develop vehicles that will meet these standards in order to fill the government’s 
demand for low emission vehicles. A coordinated approach to public procurement on a global-
scale would have a large leveraging effect on some industries (such as the car industry) although 
it is difficult to predict, and politically and practically awkward to coordinate.  
 
Countries without privatised energy markets effectively purchase power generation technologies 
directly and those governments have retained the opportunity to directly use their purchasing 
power to stimulate early deployment of energy technologies. For example, China and Indonesia 
have established purchasing policies for renewable energy technologies (wind and solar in the 
case of China and geothermal and hydro in the case of Indonesia) and have had reasonable suc-
cess in stimulating substantial penetration of renewable energy through this approach. These ap-
proaches perhaps leverage additional private investment at a ratio of 1:1–2.  
 
Another related option to stimulate the early deployment of climate change technologies would 
be to establish price guarantees (Anderson, 2006). In this approach the government would set a 
marginal price for particular technologies and would pay producers that marginal price for every 
unit of technology deployed. The price premium could be financed through taxes, a levy on elec-
tricity generation or consumption or the revenues generated through renewable energy obliga-
tions, or the auctioning of emissions permits. Assuming that the premium price approximates the 
marginal cost of abatement, this approach is likely to achieve leverage ratios similar to the CDM 
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(1:6–10). Reverse auctions and tendering mechanisms which are also related to price guarantees 
(Newell, 2008) might achieve similar leveraging.  
 
Standards and regulations are also important tools for the early deployment, but are more com-
monly associated with technologies that have already been deployed but have not yet become 
universally diffused into a society (such as the banning of incandescent light bulbs to trigger the 
widespread diffusion of compact fluorescent lights and other efficient lighting options).  
 
An example of a regulatory approach to technology deployment in the energy efficiency area is 
the proposed Industry Mandatory Energy Efficiency (IMEE) Scheme in Australia. This proposed 
scheme involves a legislative requirement for businesses to undertake energy or greenhouse gas 
emission audits and to implement all abatement opportunities identified through the audit that 
have a payback period of less than three years. An economic assessment of the proposed scheme 
concluded: 
 
Based on best available estimates of the magnitude and distribution of energy savings op-
portunities available to Australian sites, such a programme — involving mandatory as-
sessment, investment and reporting requirements for large energy consumers (consuming 
100 TJ or more of energy each year) — is likely to deliver a net economic benefit over ten 
years of around $710 million (in net present value (NPV) terms). 
 
This is based on a (notional) requirement for these sites to implement energy saving 
projects with a payback period of 3 years or less, and the effect of a modest domestic car-
bon price (assumed to average around $15 per tonne CO2e) in the period 2010 to 2020. In 
the absence of an assumed future carbon price (the value of which is currently uncertain 
and will depend on a range of international and domestic policy considerations), the net 
economic benefit is estimated at $630 million (NPV). (Allen Consulting, 2008, pg. vi) 
 
Programme costs would represent a total cost to Australian business of AUD 1.15 million, which 
is in effect is a leveraging ratio of 1:630–700 (without taking into account additional rebound ef-
fects which may significantly reduce the overall effect of such programmes). If a 50 per cent dis-
count is assumed to account for the rebound effect the leveraging ratio would be in the order of 
1:300.  
 
Preferential treatment and fast track approval processes have also commonly been used to support 
socially desirable technologies. For example, governments may establish project facilitation ser-
vices, or may fund crucial pre-project analysis (such as the identification of sequestration sites 
and infrastructure needs for carbon capture and storage) to support technologies. Estimating the 
leveraging effect of these more diffuse policy measures is difficult and no robust estimates have 
been identified within the context of this dissertation. Nonetheless, these facilitation mechanisms 
can be very important in attracting investment as they remove barriers and some of the prohibi-
tive transaction costs that would otherwise prevent advanced technology deployment.  
 
The Private Financing Advisory Network (PFAN) offers a free consulting service to project spon-
sors and developers to help them raise private sector finance by providing capacity building in 
finance knowledge and know-how transfer. PFAN functions on a small-scale but has recently se-
cured additional resources to scale up significantly. It aims to leverage USD 500–700 million 
over three years with an annual budget of under USD 5 million. During the pilot phase the PFAN 
budget was in the order of USD 1 million (including in kind support) and it was able to leverage 
in the order of USD 20 million (Climate Technology Initiative, 2008). 
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As mentioned previously a review of a sample of GEF projects in 2003 found that the GEF was 
achieving relatively low private sector leveraging. Private sector leveraging totaled USD 391 mil-
lion as a result of USD 3.6 billion total investment in GEF-3, and for the climate change focal 
area of the GEF the leveraging ratio was 1:0.62. Private leveraging was dominated by a few 
projects, with only about 20 projects (3 per cent of projects) involving private sector contributions 
(GEF, 2003a;b). However, as will be discussed in section 7.4, below, some of the GEF imple-
menting agencies (in particular the IFC and World Bank) have the ability to use concessional fi-
nancing tools and have much higher leveraging ratios, as shown in Table 12.  
 
Table 12 summarises the types of measures that governments are currently employing or may be 
considering to leverage investment from the private sector into the early and expanding deploy-
ment of new technologies that are near commercially viable yet still face significant barriers.  
 
Table 12  Summary of existing policy approaches to leveraging private sector investment in 
deployment stage.37
Policy approach 
 
 
Typical leveraging 
ratios 
Potential to Scale up 
Direct production subsidies 1:3 Small-Medium 
Direct deployment subsidies 1:2 Small-Medium 
Tax Credits 1:15 Medium 
Feed-in tariffs  1:6–10 Large 
Portfolio standards for energy generation 1:7–8 Medium 
Regulatory mechanisms for energy efficiency 1:300 Large 
Public procurement 1:1–2 Small 
Price guarantees, reverse auctions, tenders 1:6–10 Medium 
Expansion of PFAN 1:20–100 Medium 
Consumer-based energy efficiency programmes 1:10 Large 
GEF: UNDP/UNEP  1:1 Medium 
GEF: World Bank 1:5–11 Large 
Credit line for Subordinate Debt 1:2–20 Large 
Grants for Technical Assistance 1:5–20 Medium 
Soft Loan Programmes 1:0.5–5 Large 
Carbon Finance 1:6–10 Medium 
Loan Softening programmes 1:2–5 Medium 
Public Equity Fund 1:10–20 Large 
Public Venture Capital 1:10–20 Large 
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on literature referenced in section 7.3 and UNEP (2008a). 
7.4 Diffusion  
While the development, demonstration and deployment of new technologies is an important part 
of the challenge to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions, the potential for the diffusion of existing 
technologies is large, the barriers to diffusion are less significant and the public costs associated 
with diffusion of technologies can be significantly less than for new technologies.  
 
Indeed, many technologies in the diffusion stage can be implemented with net negative costs. The 
IPCC (Metz, et al., 2007) concluded that mitigation options with net negative costs have the po-
                                                 
37 Shaded instruments within this table are not described in the text above. They are either discussed in the other section 
of the dissertation, or they are described in UNEP (2008a). Leveraging ratios for these instruments are the author’s es-
timates based on the leveraging ratios of similar instruments and interviews with representatives from UNEP-SEFI. 
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tential to reduce annual emissions in 2030 by around six gigatonnes of CO2-e, accounting for 
about 10 per cent of projected global emissions. According to the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI, 2008), existing efficient technologies can contribute between 40 and 
50 per cent of total emission reductions by the year 2050.  
 
Current activities to facilitate the diffusion of technologies are dispersed, uncoordinated and 
without adequate medium and long-term goals. Many initiatives are voluntary which makes fi-
nancing unpredictable and prevents long-term strategic planning for investment and the setting of 
climate protection goals within developing countries.  
 
At the consumer level, there are now many green loan programmes in place around the world, in-
cluding within the US and Australia and in many countries in the EU. The Australian Green Loan 
Programme38
Carbon markets are a significant source of financing for the diffusion of climate change technolo-
gies. Trends in the public and private shares of financing for carbon credits are shown in Figure 
26
 combines low-interest loans of up to AUD 10000, green renovation packs as well as 
detailed household sustainability assessments. The programme involves AUD 300 million of pub-
lic investment and will leverage approximately AUD 2 billion private investment (1:7). 
 
The Austrian Federal Environment Fund (IEA Energy Efficiency Policy Database, 2009) pro-
vides subsidies to attract investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency. In 2003, just over 
EUR 60 million was invested in the diffusion of technologies resulting in private sector invest-
ments of EUR 295 million (leveraging at a ratio of 1:5).  
 
39. This figure provides an estimate of the effectiveness of carbon markets in leveraging the 
private sector to finance the incremental costs of projects. It is not a measure of the leveraging 
ratio for total investment in carbon markets (which as previously mentioned is in the order of 1:6–
10). In 2007, the public share of financing for the incremental costs of diffusion technologies was 
about one third of the private share.  
 
Figure 26 Public and private investment in carbon finance 
 
 
Source: NEF database (2008). 
 
By the end of 2008 cumulative investment through the CDM has been close to 100 billion driven 
by public investment in the incremental costs (carbon credits) of around 10 billion (Seres and 
Haites, 2008). However, the CDM does not necessarily result in any new investment; rather it 
                                                 
38 See http://www.environment.gov.au/greenloans/, last accessed 04/2010. 
39 NEF Database. Available at http://www.newenergyfinance.com/, last accessed 04/2010. 
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tends to shift where the investment might have occurred, since the purchaser of CERs is often 
from a compliance market and the emissions reduction in the CDM project offsets its liability in a 
domestic emissions trading scheme. For example, investments that would have occurred in 
Europe through the EU ETS have instead been transferred to a developing country (although at a 
lower carbon cost and usually at a lower total investment cost). 
 
In Brazil phase 1 of the PROFINA initiative (Programme of Incentives for Alternative Electricity 
Sources) has resulted in generation of 3,300 MW of renewable energy (from wind, biomass and 
small hydroelectric sources) through a system of subsidies and incentives, which draw on an En-
ergy Development Account funded by end-use consumers through an increase on energy bills. 
Total investment resulting from PROFINA was USD 3.84 billion of which private investment 
was USD 2.9 billion with a leveraging ratio of 1:4 (IEA Renewable Energy Policy Database, 
2009). 
 
In Canada, the CAD 200 million Green Municipal Investment Fund (GMIF) is a permanent re-
volving fund providing financing to municipal governments or their partners to underwrite the 
capital costs of innovative environmental infrastructure projects. The GMIF has leveraged over 
CAD 1 billion in public and private investment through an outlay of CAD 118 million in loans 
and CAD 20 million in grants in 47 capital projects since 2000 (IEA Renewable Energy Policy 
Database, 2009).  
 
The European Union’s Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) aims 
to complement the resources and instruments available from the multilateral financing institutions 
in order to increase the risk sharing options available. The startup capital provided by European 
governments is EUR 100 million. Cofinancing is expected to bring the fund up to EUR 1 billion. 
GEEREF is an investment fund of funds aiming to enhance leveraging of private sector finance. 
As the fund has only recently been operationalised, its potential to leverage the private sector is 
unknown but for the purposes of this study it is assumed that it will be as effective as many exist-
ing public venture capital funds and will leverage in the order of 1:10 (IEA Renewable Energy 
Policy Database, 2009).  
 
In regard to official development assistance, the US aid programme claims that the Global Devel-
opment Alliance (GDA) programme, which was established in 2002 to partner with governments, 
businesses, foundations, and other non-governmental organizations, has established more than 
600 alliances with over 1,700 partners, and has leveraged USD 5.8 billion in private resource 
commitments from USD 2.1 billion in U.S. government resources (Government of the USA, 
2008). That equates to a leverage ratio of about 1:2.7.  
 
Sectoral approaches to global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions have been identified as a 
key measure to be included in the post-2012 international climate change agreement. The Bali 
Plan of Action (UNFCCC, 2007b, paragraph 1 (b)(iv))called for “Enhanced national/international 
action on mitigation of climate change, including…cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-
specific actions”. Subsequently many Parties to the Convention have proposed specific sectoral 
approaches (UNFCCC, 2008d). Sectoral approaches were the subject of an in-session workshop 
of the AWG-LCA at its third session in Accra, Ghana in August 2008.  
 
A wide range of options have been canvassed and to date there is no clear consensus on which 
approaches are likely to be acceptable to the majority of the Parties. However, there does seem to 
be some degree of support for sector no-lose targets in some sectors if adequate financial and 
technical support can be committed by Annex II countries.  
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Schmidt, et al., (2008) provide an overview of how sector no-lose targets may be implemented in 
key emitting sectors. They recommend a country-based approach to avoid concerns that global 
sectoral regulatory measures would impact on national sovereignty. They also recommend re-
stricting sectoral approaches to sectors that have: 
• a small number of entities;  
• easy data collection;  
• homogenous products; and 
• participation in international trade.  
 
In practice, they claim that by focusing on the electricity generation, iron and steel, aluminium, 
oil refining, cement, lime and pulp and paper sectors it would be possible to cover 80–90 per cent 
of industrial emissions through the involvement of 20 developing countries.  
 
Essentially the no-lose target approach would involve the setting of sectoral greenhouse gas emis-
sion intensity (i.e. emissions per unit of production) baselines and crediting (providing a flow of 
finance to the value of the marginal cost of abatement) for emissions reductions in developing 
countries below the baseline. The mechanism would potentially use the existing institutions and 
mechanism of the CDM.  
 
Ward, et al., (2008) investigate the role of sector no-lose targets in scaling up finance for climate 
change mitigation activities in developing countries. As illustrated in Figure 27, they depict the 
scaling up or aggregation of activities from the existing project and emerging programmatic-
based CDM to sectoral CDM, policy-based CDM and finally sectoral or whole of economy no-
lose targets. 
 
Figure 27 Options for increasing the scaling up of the CDM 
 
Source: Ward, et al., (2008) 
 
Programmatic approaches to the CDM involve aggregating small-scale activities that each follow 
exactly the same methodology and thereby allow for an unlimited number of actions to occur 
within one approved CDM programme. This approach is currently being trialled under the CDM, 
but has yet to result in large-scale emissions reductions.  
 
Sectoral CDM involves the inclusion of an entire sector of a developing country as a single CDM 
project. The most likely option would be that credits would be awarded to national governments 
for reductions in emissions intensity below the baseline for that sector. The government would 
implement policies and measures to reduce emissions in the sector and would receive credits if 
emissions fall below the baseline. It would then distribute those credits to entities within the sec-
tor according to that entities contribution to the overall level of emissions intensity reductions. 
 
Policy CDM would involve approving the policies of national governments that resulted in emis-
sions reductions, potentially across several sectors. However, the COP has explicitly ruled out 
this approach. Paragraph 20 of decision 4/CMP.1 states “that a local/regional/national policy or 
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standard cannot be considered as a clean development mechanism project activity” (UNFCCC, 
2005). An example of a policy that may be considered is where a government adopts a national 
energy efficiency target to increase national energy efficiency by a defined amount relative to a 
baseline. However, difficulties in measuring and verifying emissions reductions that where the 
direct result of a national policy may be insurmountable and for this reason there has been little 
progress in the development of this approach.  
 
Sectoral no-lose targets (SNLTs) are similar to the Sectoral CDM approach discussed above. 
However, according to Ward, et al., (2008) “the main difference between sectoral CDM and 
SNLTs is that the technicalities referring to baselines, monitoring and verification, as well as the 
supervision and approval by the CDM Executive Board, would be maintained under a sectoral 
CDM, while the national sector baseline for a sector no-lose target would be negotiated at the 
COP level. 
 
In terms of the levels of private investment that would result from any of these approaches, it is 
likely that on average the ratio between public investment (i.e. the marginal cost of abatement or 
the cost of the carbon credits) and private investment would remain at a similar level to the cur-
rent ratio under the CDM, which is about 1:6-10. This is because the same types mitigation ac-
tions would occur with the same public/private investment ratios, only on a larger-scale. The ef-
fectiveness of this mechanism would be greater as certain barriers to investment would be re-
moved. For example, the total administrative and other transaction cost burdens on private inves-
tors would be reduced. However, because the flow of credits under sectoral approaches is to na-
tional governments, the ability to attract private investment would become dependent upon the 
overall strategic approach of those governments and the incentives and other regulatory ap-
proaches used to stimulate investment in emissions reductions. The potential to scale up is ulti-
mately a function of the demand for credits, which is fundamentally driven by the emission re-
duction targets set by Annex I countries. If Annex I countries do not set ambitious targets then the 
demand for emissions reductions in developing countries will be low, resulting in low prices for 
credits and lower overall abatement activity.  
 
Table 13 summarises the types of measures that governments are currently employing or may be 
considering to leverage investment from the private sector for the diffusion of technologies. The 
instruments in the shaded part of the Table where discussed in the previous section on Deploy-
ment, but are also relevant to technologies in the diffusion stage. Measures shaded in the table are 
results from UNEP (2008a) and have not been discussed above.  
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Table 13  Summary of existing policy approaches to leveraging private sector investment in 
diffusion stage technologies40
Policy approach 
 
 
Typical leveraging 
ratios 
Potential to Scale up 
Green loan programmes 1:7 Large 
Subsidy and grant programmes 1:5 Medium 
Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
Fund 
1:10 Medium 
Canadian Green Municipal Fund 1:10–20 Large 
Official Development Assistance 1:2–3 Small 
CDM - Project 1:6-10 Medium 
CDM - Programmatic 1:6-10 Medium 
Sector no-lose targets 1:6-10  Large 
Expansion of PFAN 1:20–100 Medium 
Consumer-based energy efficiency programmes 1:10 Large 
GEF: UNDP/UNEP  1:1 Medium 
GEF: World Bank 1:5–11 Large 
Credit line for Senior Debt 1:0.5–5 High 
Guarantee 1:2–20 High 
Credit line for Subordinate Debt 1:2–20 High 
Grants for Technical Assistance 1:5–20 Medium 
Loan Softening programmes 1:2–5 Medium 
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on literature referenced in section 7.4 and UNEP (2008a). 
                                                 
40 Shaded instruments in the table are not described in the text above. They are either discussed in the other section of 
the dissertation, or they are described in UNEP (2008a). Leveraging ratios for these instruments are the author’s esti-
mates based on the leveraging ratios of similar instruments and interviews with representatives from UNEP-SEFI. 
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8 Summary of leveraging potential by stage of technological 
maturity  
 
Section 7 reviewed a wide range of policies and measures currently being implemented or pro-
posed for inclusion in the post-2012 climate change agreement. The ability of these initiatives to 
leverage investment from the private sector varies considerably. Figure 28 and Table 14 summa-
rise the leveraging potential of all policies and measures reviewed in this dissertation according to 
the stage of technological maturity that they most support.  
 
Figure 28 Summary of measures reviewed, including typical leveraging ratios by stage of 
technological maturity  
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s diagram summarising references contained in Chapter 7.  
 
Evidence suggests that private sector financing of climate change technologies is heavily reliant 
upon stimulus from the public sector, through the establishment of market conditions and ena-
bling environments, policies and measures that remove barriers to technology, and through grants 
and fiscal policies that make climate change technologies financially viable (UNEP, 2008a; 
Doornbosch, et al., 2008).  
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Table 14  Summary of leveraging potential of policies and measures reviewed in this Chapter 741
Research and Development 
 
Demonstration Deployment Diffusion 
Initiative Leverage  Initiative Leverage  Initiative Leverage  Initiative Leverage  
Grants - Direct 1:0–0.5 Grants 1:5–10 Direct production subsidies 1:3 Green loan programmes 1:7 
Leveraged Grants 1:3–4 Public Private Part-
nerships 
1:1–2 Direct deployment subsidies 1:2 Subsidy and grant pro-
grammes 
1:5 
Joint Public/Private Re-
search Centres 
1:0.2–1 Public Procurement 1:0.5–1 Tax Credits 1:15 GEERE Fund 1:10 
Network of Innovation 
Centres 
1:7–8 Early-stage Public 
Venture Capital 
1:10–20 Feed-in tariffs  1:6–10 Canadian Green Municipal 
Fund 
1:10–20 
Incubators 1:1–20 Inducement Prizes 1:10–20 Portfolio standards for en-
ergy generation 
1:7–8 Official Development Assis-
tance 
1:2–3 
Tax incentives 1:1   Regulatory mechanisms for 
energy efficiency 
1:300 CDM - Project 1:6-10 
Advanced Purchasing 
Commitments 
1:1–2   Public procurement 1:1–2 CDM - Programmatic 1:6-10 
Inducement Prizes 1:1–2   Price guarantees, reverse 
auctions, tenders 
1:6–10 Sector no-lose targets 1:6-10  
    Expansion of PFAN 1:20–100 Expansion of PFAN 1:20–100 
    Consumer-based energy 
efficiency programmes 
1:10 Consumer-based energy 
efficiency programmes 
1:10 
    GEF: UNDP/UNEP  1:1 GEF: UNDP/UNEP  1:1 
    GEF: World Bank 1:5–11 GEF: World Bank 1:5–11 
    Credit line for Subordinate 
Debt 
1:2–20 Credit line for Senior Debt 1:0.5–5 
    Grants for Technical Assis-
tance 
1:5–20 Guarantee 1:2–20 
    Carbon Finance 1:6-10 Credit line for Subordinate 
Debt 
1:2–20 
    Loan Softening pro-
grammes 
1:2–5 Grants for Technical Assis-
tance 
1:5–20 
    Public Equity Fund 1:10–20 Loan Softening programmes 1:2–5 
    Public Venture Capital 1:10–20   
                                                 
41 Shaded boxes indicate those public policies or investment programmes that have the potential to be increased in scale to a level where financial flows may exceed USD 5 billion 
per annum 
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As explained in Chapter 2, an estimation of the average leveraging ratios needs to be made in or-
der to test various scenarios of the public and private shares of financing that may be required un-
der a post-2012 international climate change agreement.  
 
It was also explained in Chapter 7 that the overall impact of public policies and investment pro-
grammes vary. As identified in Table 14, some measures can be significantly scaled up, whereas 
others have limited application. For this reason, average leveraging ratios are selected taking into 
account the ability to scale up the various public policies and investment programmes that have 
been reviewed in Chapter 7.  
 
Three sets of average leveraging ratios are arrived at in Table 15. All are derived from the sum-
mary of leveraging ratios in Table 14. The first set is and assessment of the averaging leveraging 
ratios by stage of technological maturity for existing public policies and investment programmes. 
The second set assumes that governments adopt an enhanced set of policies and investment pro-
grammes that have moderately improved leveraging ratios. The third set assumes that govern-
ments adopt policies and investment programmes that significantly increase leveraging of the pri-
vate sector. This third scenario assumes an optimistic and very high performance set of public 
policies and investment programmes are employed extensively. The three sets of average leverag-
ing ratios are then applied as scenarios in Chapter 9 to estimate the public and private share of fi-
nancing.  
 
Table 15  Average leveraging ratios of policies and measures reviewed in this dissertation 
according to the stage of technological maturity: Existing, Moderately En-
hanced; and High Performance 
 
 R&D  Demonstration  Deployment  Diffusion  
Global Global Global Developing Global Developing 
Estimated 
existing  
leverage  
ratio 
1:0.5 1:1 1:4 1:2 1:8 1:6 
Moderately 
enhanced 
leverage  
ratio 
1:1 1:3 1:5 1:4 1:10 1:8 
High per-
formance 
enhanced 
leverage  
ratio 
1:2 1:4 1:10 1:8 1:20 1:15 
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Table 14, above and reviews of leveraging ratios contained in Chapter 7.  
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9 Estimating the public and private share of finance for climate 
change mitigation technologies based on average leverage 
ratios  
 
As previously discussed, public financing for climate change may be restricted either because the 
new climate change agreement is unable to secure a full commitment from Annex II countries to 
provide the necessary financing for climate change, or because economic circumstances or the 
competing priorities for public financing do not allow for sufficient public financing to be pro-
vided.  
 
Indeed, this is the outcome that was negotiated by Heads of State in the high level segment at 
COP15, which resulted in the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009d). While not specific in 
terms of the implementation details, the Accord agrees to establish a new Fund that would by 
2020 channel USD 100 billion per annum in finance for mitigation and adaptation, including for 
technology development and transfer. The Accord states that this flow of finance will include 
public and private finance, although the amount of either source of finance is not specified.  
 
In Table 16 the public and private shares of finance are estimated under three scenarios as de-
scribed in Chapter 8. Even under the most optimistic scenario for leveraging private sector in-
vestment, USD 30–100 billion per annum would need to be made available by the public sector 
for investment into climate change mitigation technologies.  
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Table 16 Three leveraging ratio scenarios for public and private investment shares based on UNFCCC (2009b) estimates of additional fi-
nancing needs for technology to 2050 (Author’s estimates based on UNFCCC (2009b), Table 14, above and reviews of leveraging 
ratios contained in Chapter 7) 
 
 USD Billion TOTAL R&D  Demonstration  Deployment  Diffusion & Commercial 
Global Global Global Developing Global Developing 
 Total annual 
additional  
finance 
339.3–834 25.8–170 At least 27–36 55–139 
At least  
10–38.5  231.5–489 93.3–282.8 
SCENARIO 
1 
Estimated ex-
isting leverage 
ratio 
 1:0.5 1:1 1:4 1:2 1:8 1:6 
 Private 271.6–621.4 8.6–56.7 13.5–18 44–112 7.7–25.7 205.8–433.7 80–242.4 
 Public 67.4–213.6 17.2–113.3 13.5–18 11–27 3.3–12.8 25.7–55.3 13.3–40.4 
SCENARIO 
2 
Moderately 
enhanced lev-
erage ratio 
 
1:1 1:3 1:5 1:4 1:10 1:8 
 Private 289.4–672.3 12.9–85 20.25–27 45.8–115.8 8–30.8 210.5–444.5 82.9–251.4 
 Public 49.85–161.7 12.9–85 6.75–9 9.2–23.2 2–7.7 21–44.5 10.4–31.4 
SCENARIO 
3 
High perform-
ance en-
hanced lever-
age ratio 
 
1:2 1:4 1:10 1:8 1:20 1:15 
 Private 299.3–734.2 17.2–113.3 11.6–28.8 50–126.4 8.9–34.2 220.5–465.7 87.5–265.1 
 Public 30–99.8 8.6–56.7 5.4–7.2 5–12.6 1.1–4.3 11–23.3 5.8–17.7 
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The reverse can also be tested by asking what leveraging ratios would be necessary if public in-
vestment is limited to USD 50 billion or USD 100 billion per annum. In order to test this scenario 
it is assumed that actual investments are roughly proportional to the investment needs across the 
various stages of technology (as contained in Figure 11 in Chapter 6, above).  
 
In scenario one it is assumed that total additional public investment in R&D increases by USD 5 
billion per annum, demonstration investments by USD 5 billion per annum, deployment invest-
ments by USD 15 billion and diffusion investments by USD 25 billion. In scenario 2 where  
USD 100 billion is allocated per annum, USD 10 billion per annum for R&D, for demonstration 
USD 10 billion per annum, deployment USD 30 billion and diffusion USD 50 billion. The results 
are presented in Table 17, below.  
 
Under these scenarios, it may be achievable to meet financing needs for climate change if public 
financing is limited to an additional USD 100 billion per annum, however, if public finance is 
limited to an additioanl USD 50 billion per annum, significant increases in the average leveraging 
ratios would be required for technologies in the deployment and diffusion stage, and it would 
seem unlikely that sufficient investment in R&D could be achieved, particularly if the high end of 
the range is to be realised and leveraging ratios in the order of 1:33 are required. 
 
While estimates are made in Table 14, the extent to which the policies and investment por-
grammes surveyed may be able to be scaled up is unknown, and this will have a significant bear-
ing on where at the international level the greatest effort should be made. Ideally, the total in-
vestment scale of each policy would be estimated and together with leverage ratios and other fac-
tors in mind, a more useful assessment of financial needs could be made. It is clear that a mix of 
policy instruments is required for international climate change policy but the exact mix in differ-
ent regions is not known.  
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Table 17 Implications of restricted public funding for leveraging ratios if total investment continues to meet UNFCCC (2009b) estimates of 
additional financing needs for technology to 2050 (Author’s estimates based on UNFCCC (2009b), Table 14, above and reviews 
of leveraging ratios contained in Chapter 7) 
 
 USD Billion TOTAL R&D  Demonstration  Deployment  Diffusion & Commercial 
Global Global Global Developing Global Developing 
 Total annual 
additional  
finance 
339.3–834 25.8–170 At least 27–36 55–139 
At least  
10–38.5  231.5–489 93.3–282.8 
SCENARIO 
1– 50 Billion 
Public In-
vestment 
per annum 
Required lev-
erage ratio 
1:6–1:16 1:4–1:33 1:4–1:6 1:2–1:8 1:0–1:3 1:8–1:19 1:5–1:18 
 Private 289.3–784 20.8–165 22–31 35–124 1-29.5 206.5–464 78.3–267.8 
 Public 50 5 5 15 9 25 15 
SCENARIO 
2– 100 Bil-
lion Public 
Investment 
per annum 
Required lev-
erage ratio 
1:2–1:7 1:1–1:15 1:1–1:2 1:0–1:3 1:0–1:1 1:4–1:9 1:2–1:8 
 Private 239.3–734 10.8–155 12–21 5–94 0–20.5 181.5–439 63.3–252.8 
 Public 100 10 10 30 18 50 30 
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10 Conclusions  
A post-2012 international climate change agreement cannot hope to leverage private sector in-
vestment on the scale needed unless ambitious climate change targets are agreed by Annex I 
Parties and actions are taken by developing countries to significantly reduce emissions below 
the business as usual scenario. These commitments and actions will be the key drivers for the 
private sector, which will respond to these long-term policy signals by adjusting their invest-
ment strategies.  
 
While the concept of leveraging the private sector is commonly used within the negotiations for 
a post-2012 international climate change agreement (and also in many existing national re-
sponses to the issue), there has been limited assessment of how individual public policies and 
investment programmes can achieve leverage and what would be the optimal level of public fi-
nance needed to ensure that the total level of public and private investment is realised.  
 
In Chapter 3, many methodological issues associated with the using the concept of leveraging 
were identified. These will need to be addressed if the concept can be used successfully as a pol-
icy objective and as an evaluative tool. Similar methodological issues are apparent when ac-
counting for greenhouse gas emission reductions. However, in accounting for emissions reduc-
tions, relatively sophisticated methodologies have been established by Parties under the Con-
vention to handle issues such as double counting, defining boundaries, accounting for leakage 
and testing for additionality. The Convention processes, perhaps under the authority of the Sub-
sidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, should develop the accounting standards 
and methodologies for the leveraging effects of public policies and investment programmes.  
 
There is also the need for post-hoc evaluations of financing for technology development and 
transfer under the Convention. Most of the leveraging ratio estimates that are available in the 
literature for public policies and investment programmes report only projected rather than actual 
private sector investment. It would be useful to know when significant changes between pro-
jected and actual private sector leveraging are occuring, because it may indicate where a differ-
ent mix of financing policies or mechanisms is required.  
 
Creating the enabling environment necessary to attract private sector investment is crucial for 
the success of public policies and investment programmes aimed at leveraging the private sec-
tor. Without greater effort to establish this enabling environment both in developed and devel-
oping countries, the efficiency of public policies and investment programmes may be severely 
impaired. Elements of a successful strategy to address the enabling environment for private in-
vestment where identified in Chapter 5.  
 
With well designed policies and programmes, leveraging effects can cascade from simple direct 
effects through to broader, more amplified effects on the private sector, particularly where there 
is a suitable enabling environment. The concept of a cascading leveraging effect was introduced 
in Chapter 3, and evidence of this effect, while limited, was found in Chapter 7. This suggests 
the need for integrated approaches to policy design, emphasising a combination of financial and 
technical resources, with complementary policy reforms, if the objective is to enhance the en-
gagement of the private sector in helping to solve the issue of climate change.  
 
Apart from the obvious quantitative gap in financing for technology development and transfer, 
there are also many qualitative gaps which may be equally as important, particularly if the aim 
is to facilitate mitigation in developing countries. These gaps may be partially addressed by 
measures aimed at leveraging the private sector, however, they often require complementary 
policies and measures that can support private sector investment in clean technologies. Public 
policies and investment programmes aimed at leveraging the private sector should attempt to 
address both the issue of the quantity of investment that is required (such as through agreed 
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quantitative goals for financing) while targeting the qualitative gaps, such as those identified in 
Chapter 6. 
 
This dissertation has reviewed the specific gaps in the existing financing system and has identi-
fied a wide range of financing options that would address these gaps. Leveraging ratios of pub-
lic policies and investment programmes vary considerably at each stage of the technology inno-
vation cycle, as was apparent from the survey of leveraging ratios contained in Chapter 7. How-
ever, on average, leveraging ratios tend to follow a trend whereby the leveraging potential in-
creases as a technology moves from the R&D stage, into the demonstration, deployment and 
diffusion stages of technological maturity. This is consistent with the theory of incremental 
costs as described in the literature and summarised in Chapter 4.  
 
There is an opportunity to improve policies and investment programmes by sharing lessons 
learned and adopting best practices so as to enhance the quantity of finance leveraged from the 
private sector. In some cases, there may be no substitute for public financing. In others the po-
tential role of the private sector may remain unclear, as is often the case for technologies for ad-
aptation. Private sector financing may also be considered undesirable by some Parties who be-
lieve that the public sector is the most appropriate institution to finance responses to climate 
change. Ultimately, these are political choices that will be made by Parties through the bargain-
ing and negotiation process currently underway within the UNFCCC towards ratifying a new 
international agreement for the period 2012 and beyond.   
 
Regulatory approaches to enhance energy efficiency are the most effective means of reducing 
emissions without the need for large-scale public expenditure. Public expenditure on energy ef-
ficiency measures should be reserved for the removal of key market and social barriers, loan 
guarantees and loan softening and measures that build capacity and ensure institutions are effec-
tive in supporting private investment. With a supportive policy regime in place, the returns on 
investment from fuel and other cost savings can be a sufficient incentive to motivate large re-
ductions in projected emissions growth, so long as the opportunity cost is not percieved as 
greater. However, regulatory approaches that mandate energy efficiency outcomes are notori-
ously unpopular or difficult to enact. Political realism is needed when it comes to assumptions 
about the extent to which such regulatory approaches will be used in practice, at least in the 
short to medium term. To what extent they will be used is very difficult to predict, but caution 
should nonetheless be used when estimating financing and technology needs.  
 
Options for stimulating private sector investment in R&D are more limited than in other stages 
of the technology innovation cycle. Due to the risks involved and the public good nature of 
R&D in highly advanced technologies that dramatically reduce or even sequester greenhouse 
gases, there will be a larger public role for financing R&D. Options such as inducement prizes 
may be effective in enhancing innovation and private investment in R&D, however, the overall 
effect of these instruments will be minor in scale. Parties are proposing a quadrupling of R&D 
investment over the next 5–10 years, and if invested effectively, large technological advances 
will be possible and large flows of private sector finance to R&D will be achieved. The key will 
be how to direct this flow of finance to support the capacity of developing countries.  
 
In regard to demonstration technologies, the European Union has recently innovated within the 
EU-ETS to create an earmarked allocation of permits to support demonstration projects. This 
approach shows merit since by attaching an additional incentive for demonstration to a carbon 
financing instrument there is the potential to increase private sector leveraging above and be-
yond what could have been achieved through grants and other direct subsidies. In Chapter 6, the 
case was presented for the introduction of a large international venture capital fund to fill the 
existing gap in early stage venture capital in all countries outside of the United States.  
 
Early deployment of technologies is crucial to drive down the cost of new technologies and to 
enable developing countries to ‘leap frog’ the emissions intensive development pathways of de-
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veloped countries. However, these will rely upon financial transfers from developed to develop-
ing countries. Furthermore a project-by-project approach cannot hope to reach the scale neces-
sary. Instead a policy-scale approach is needed, where developing countries receive financing 
for the introduction of policies (such as feed-in tariffs, renewable obligations and targets) that 
also remove barriers, create markets and directly deploy new technologies.  
 
Ultimately, emission reductions require a shift in global financing toward a low to zero emis-
sions economy. Ideally, they would function so effectively that they would be emissions-
positive, thereby undoing the current accumulation of emissions that is threatening to destablize 
the climate system. A large shift will need to occur at all scales an in all sectors. The widespread 
diffusion of low emission technologies is the largest challenge and requires the largest invest-
ments; however, the potential role for the private sector is also the greatest. Progress has been 
made through the creation of the CDM which is beginning to approach a formidable scale. 
However, the CDM will not be sufficient and the best hope for the widespread diffusion of 
technologies in the foreseeable future is a complex mix of policies and measures. In addition to 
regulatory measures mentioned previously, finance facilitation and creation of a very active and 
well resourced project development pipeline is particularly important. There is evidence that fi-
nanciers are unable to identify enough quality investment opportunities. Creating projects and 
programmes and matching these with financiers is likely to be very cost-effective.  
 
During the course of this study, many policies and measures have been identified that are rela-
tively ineffective in mobilising the private sector. The redesign of many mechanisms function-
ing at the sub-national, national and international levels could yield significant benefits in total 
financing. As part of (and in preparation for) the post-2012 international climate change agree-
ment, Parties should review their climate change policies and measures, learn lessons from 
elsewhere and identify enhancements to existing measures and new options to address gaps and 
barriers to financing and emissions reductions. This might best occur as part of a new global ef-
fort to develop a coherent system of national climate change strategies.  
 
This dissertation has demonstrated that even with optimistic scenarios for private sector leverag-
ing, public financing will be crucial to achieving the objectives of the Convention. Even with 
the introduction of superior policy tools that are more effecting in mobilising the private sector, 
there are limits to the extent to which Annex II governments can limit their financing responsi-
bilities to address climate change if the objectives of the Convention are to be met, given the 
need to fund the incremental costs of mitigation technologies in developing countries. The 
analysis contained in this dissertation suggests that governments should collectively be aiming 
to raise public finance in the order of USD 50–160 billion per annum as part of the post-2012 
climate change agreement, assuming a moderate increase in the average private sector leverag-
ing effect of public policies and investment programmes. Costs for financing of adaptation re-
sponses will be additional to these costs, although there may be some opportunity for adaptation 
and mitigation responses to be combined to some extent so that both adaptation and mitigation 
outcomes are achieved simultaneously, in which case it may be possible to achieve required re-
sults at an overall reduced cost.  
 
The required public finance could flow through a range of public institutions, both inside and 
outside of the Convention. However, this dissertation argues that the role of the financial 
mechanism of the Convention is crucial, and that there is a need to raise its prominence and fi-
nancial and political authority so that it can shape the overall financial landscape as it affects 
climate change. Based on the assessment of the finance gap and the scenarios for leveraging of 
the private sector, this dissertation lends weight to the concept as contained in the Copenhagen 
Accord (UNFCCC, 2009d) to establish a new ‘fund of funds’ under the Convention (the Copen-
hagen Green Climate Fund). It should containing at least USD 50 billion per annum of public 
finance for mitigation, and it should aim to leverage an additional USD 300 billion per annum 
from private sources through innovative public financial mechanisms and public-private part-
nerships, such as those reviewed in Chapter 7. The remaining USD 100 billion per annum of 
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public finance would be channelled through a range of other public financial institutions and 
mechanisms outside of the Convention, including at the national level, and would aim to lever-
age an additional USD300–400 billion per annum. The overall result in terms of financial flow 
from both public and private sources would be in the order of USD 750–800 billion per annum 
by 2020.  
 
If public finance is significantly restricted then greater emphasis on consessional finance and 
regulatory approaches to public policy will be necessary. Based on the survey of the literature 
contained in Chapter 7, public policy and investment programmes are available for technologies 
in the deployment and diffusion stages that could generate the required total investment under a 
scenario where public finance is restricted to USD 50 billion per annum. However, it is unlikely 
that sufficient investment in R&D could be mobilized under this scenario, which would impact 
on the ability to achieve longer term emission reductions needed for more ambitious global 
goals, such as the target contained in the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009d) of limiting av-
erage global temperature increases to below two degrees Celsius.  
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